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ABSTRACT
The investment provisions of NAFTA, which establish a

liberal investment regime and a hospitable atmospherefor

foreign investment amongst its signatories, the United States,
Canada, and Mexico, represents a new chapter in Mexico's
approach to foreign investment This Article examines the
signifIcance of Mexico's shift to welcoming foreign investment

and its concomitant acquiescence to traditional notions of
expropriationand compensation espoused by more developed
states. -The author explores Mexico's historical love-hate
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relationship with foreign investment and its role over the
years as leading voicefor Third World concerns regardingthe
potentially exploitive nature of such investment In this

Article, a less flattering view of Mexico's participation in
NAFTA emerges, one that perceives the Mexican government
as repudiating not only its role as guiding hand in its own
economy, but also its place as the leading proponent of the
Third World cautionaryapproachtoforeign investment.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)' is the

first regional trade pact between a Third World state2 and two

1.

North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,

Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 [hereinafter NAFTA].
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industrialized states.3 Chapter 11 of NAFTA (Investment Chapter
or Chapter 11) establishes a liberalized investment regime that
expands the protection of foreign investors and investments
beyond any treaty to which any NAFTA signatory is a party. Most
of the provisions contained in this Chapter have been. fashioned
on traditional rules of international law that Mexico had
successfully challenged since the end of the nineteenth century

and for most of this century. Thus, the provisions in Chapter 11
amount to a repudiation of long-standing differences between
Mexico and the United States concerning the protection of foreign
investors and investments. 4 Moreover, Chapter 11 will have farreaching implications in the larger context of international
economic relations between Third World and industrialized states.
Throughout the last century, the Third World has opposed
traditional rules of international law governing the rights of
foreign investors. This opposition has caused significant conflict
in North-South relations. 5
In the post-World War II era,
2.
"Third World states" or "developing states" consist of a diverse group.
Although Mexico is often referred to as a "newly industrialized state," it is still
part of the Third World. Third World states, including the newly industrialized
states, perceive that their solidarity is necessary because industrialized states
have taken advantage of them in the past. See generally C. MICHAEL AHO &
JONATHAN D. ARONSON, TRADE TALKS: AMERICA BETTER LISTEN 98 (1985) (discussing

the diversity of the economic interest of Third World states and how they usually
maintain a united front when dealing with the industrial world in economic
issues).
3.
The term "industrialized states" includes the several states of Western
Europe, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. It

roughly coincides with the membership of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). "Although the extent of governmental
intervention in the economies of these states varies greatly, all of the states rely
substantially on the market forces of supply and demand to determine what shall
be produced and how it shall be distributed, and all allow considerable private
ownership of the means of production." Harold K. Jacobson & Dusan Sidjanskil,
The Continuing Evolution of the Global Political Economy, In THE EMERGINO

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER:
DYNAMIC PROCESSES, CONSTRAINTS, AND
OPPoRTUNnES 13, 14 (Harold K. Jacobson & Dusan Sidjanski eds., 1982).
4. See generally GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY SCHOT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1992) (studying substance and form of
possible NAFTA). For the debate over NAFTA, see Frances L. Ansley, North
American Free TradeAgreement. The Public Debate, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 329

(1992).
5. The developing states of the "South" sought to engage the industrial
states of the "North" in an ongoing dialogue on matters relating to development
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developing states asserted their right to "full sovereignty" in the
treatment of foreign investment located in their territories and
used the United Nations and other multilateral fora to support
their claims.8 On the other hand, the United States and other
industrialized states have insisted that, under traditional
principles of international law, foreigners and foreign-owned
property possess superseding contractual rights.7 The conflict
has sharpened with the increasing prevalence of Transnational
Corporations (TNCs),8 which are the main vehicles of foreign
direct investment 9 and major actors in international economic
and the global economic system. In particular, the developing states stressed
that they would seek "... . to obtain greater equality of opportunity and to secure
the right to sit as equals around the bargaining tables of the world." Mahbub ul
Hag, Negotiating a New Bargainwith the Rich Countries, In BEYOND DEPENDENCY:
THE DEVELOPING WORLD SPEAKs OuT 158 (Guy F. Erb & Valerina Kalab, eds..
1975). The demands by the South have been described as encompassing three
broad areas: (1) changes favorable to LDCs In the broad economic principles
under which economic Interaction currently takes place (for example,
nondiscrimination and primary reliance on market forces for determining the
terms of trade); (2) specific concessions n, and greater amounts of, aid, including
generous treatment of exports from developing states and specific commodity
agreements; and (3) greater power n decisionmaking (for example, moving more
negotiations to the United Nations where their voices carry more weight). Sidney
Weintraub, What LIfe Is Left In the North-South Dialogue?, 2 WORLD ECON. 453, 457
(1980); see also F.V. Garcia-Amador, The Proposed New InternationalEconomic
Order:A New Approach to the Law Governing Nationalizationand Compensation, 12
LAW. AM. 1 (1980); Timothy W. Stanley, An Unorthodox View of The North-South
Dialogue, 18 ATLANTIC CoMMUNIrY Q. 310 (1980).
6.
See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
7.
See Infra notes 22-52 and accompanying text.
8.
See infra note 25 and accompanying text. There is a continuing debate
in both academic and governmental circles as to the proper definition of the TNC.
The discussion focuses on the following issues- the requisite geographical spread
(number of states In which the company must be involved); the ties that purport
to link the TNC to Its component parts (beneficial ownership in contrast to looser
bonds, such as licensing or sales arrangements); size, managerial structure (the
multinationality of management and its domestic versus international
orientation); and ownership patterns (including the level of state involvement).
For further discussion of the debate surrounding the definition of the TNC, see
Yalr Anaroni, On the Definition of the MultinationalCorporation, 11 Q. REv. ECON. &
Bus. 27 (Autumn 1971); Yitzhak Hadari, The Structure of the PrivateMultinational
Enterprise,71 MICH. L. REV. 729 (1973). The TNC Is essentially a post-World War
H phenomenon, facilitated by the Bretton Woods Institutions, which generally
liberalized the world economy, and facilitated the growth of new techniques of
communications. DON WALLACE, JR., INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPoRATIoNs 5-12 (1976).
9.
This Article focuses on "direct" private Investment, instead of "portfolio"
or "indirect" investment. Jurgen Voss defines direct investment as follows:
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relations.
Recently, the conflict has intensified with the
phenomenon characterized as an emerging de facto system of
transnationalization or globalization of economic relations. This
change in international economic relations has led to attempts by
both Third World and industrialized states to devise international
mechanisms to support their respective positions regarding the
rights of foreign investors.
Third World states have
unsuccessfully advocated for control of TNCs, while the United
States and other industrialized states have attempted to reaffirm

the traditional rules of international law through bilateral
arrangements.
For these reasons, most Third World states,
especially Mexico and other Latin American states, resisted
negotiating these bilateral arrangements in the past.
They
instead have chosen to debate the foreign investment issue in the
multilateral arena. This was true until the last decade, when the
Third World, lacking other financial alternatives, became more
desperate for capital. In recent years, debt-burdened Third World
governments increasingly have opened their economies to foreign
investment.
To assure a meaningful assessment of the NAFTA provisions,
the analytical framework of this Article includes the broader
issues implicated in international economic relations; specifically,
it addresses the conflict between Third World and industrialized
states over the rules governing foreign investment.
The
obligations contained in NAFTA's Chapter 11 are part of an
emerging new pattern of legal rules that promote the traditional
principles of international law. Part II of this Article examines the
international controversy over legal rules governing foreign direct
investment, focusing on the divergence of interests between Third
World and industrialized states. Part III focuses on the role of
Direct investment means the investment of money, goods or services in a
project for entrepreneurial commitment, especially establishing subsidiary
companies or takeover of enterprises; capitalizing branches and plants
endowments; securing equity holdings with powers of management and
control (generally of 25%); making long-term loans with low or
partnership-type interest rates in conjunction with equity holdings.
Jurgen Voss, The Protection and Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment, In
Developing Countries: Interests, Interdependencles, Intricacies, 31 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 686 (1982). See also GERALD K. HELLEINER, TRANSNATIoNAL CORPORATIONS,

DmECr FOREIGN INvESTMENT

AND EcONOMIc DEVELOPMENT

(1986).

1994]

NAFTA AND INVESTMENT IN MEXICO

foreign direct investment in Mexico's economic development and
the evolution of its legal framework for foreign direct investment.
This Part also evaluates, from a historical perspective, the role the
Mexican government has played in the state's economic
development and regulation of foreign direct investment. For the
balance of the Article, Parts IV and V discuss the NAFTA
investment provisions and the implications for the Third World.
I1. THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF FOREIGN DIRECT INvESTMENT:

A HISTORICAL POLITIcO-ECONOMIC

THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE

A. The Nineteenth Century and Rules of State Responsibility to
Aliens andAllen Property
The international regime for foreign direct investment can be
fully understood only in the context of the politico-economic
factors that typify the international arena. The history of the
ever-evolving international framework for foreign direct
investment has been molded by the diverse political interests and
economic circumstances of developed and developing states. 10
Since the end of the nineteenth century, the developed states
have been preoccupied with securing international standards for
the protection of the investments of their nationals and firms
abroad, fashioned on the traditional rules of the protection of
property. These traditional rules were developed from the law of
state responsibility of injury to aliens and alien property."1 The
law of state responsibility of injury to aliens and alien property,
"inspired by Western laissez-faire ideas and liberal concepts of
property," 12 underlies the traditional principles of customary
international law. 13 This doctrine emphasizes restricting the
10. See generally RACHEL MCCULLOCH, EcONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE
NEW INTERNAL ECONOMIC ORDER (Int'l Inst. Economic Research Paper No. 22,
1979) (discussing the economic and political issues underlying the control of
foreign capital).
11. See Samuel K.B. Asante, InternationalLaw and Foreign Investment. A
Reappraisal,37 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 588, 590 (1988).
12. Id.
13. Id. Originally conceived as a means of protecting aliens and alien
property, the rules subsequently were applied to foreign firms and companies.
See generally CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1928); Georg Schwarzenberger, The Protection of British Property Abroad, in 5

CURRENT LEGAL PROBs. (George W. Keeton & Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 1952).
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extent to which the host state can Interfere with private property,
thereby protecting the private property of aliens. In this regard, a
breach of the international minimum

standard "provides a

legitimate basis for the exercise by the home State of the right of
diplomatic protection of the alien."14
In the nineteenth century, when the prevailing rules
governing foreign capital were legitimated mainly by treaties and

custom, acceptance of these rules by the colonial territories and
noncolonial territories economically linked to the European
powers15 ultimately derived from the military 8 and the financial

14. Asante, supra note 11, at 590. For detailed discussion of minimum
standard, see Eawintt M. Borchard, The Minimum Standard in Protectionof Aliens,
33 A.S.I.L. PRoc. (1939). As early as Vattel, legal scholars defended the rights of
states to protect their citizens abroad. Vattel wrote that "whoever uses a citizen
ill, indirectly offends the state, which is bound to protect this citizen, and the
sovereign of the latter should avenge his wrongs, punish the aggressor, and, if
possible, oblige him to make full reparation; since otherwise the citizen would not
obtain the great end of the civil association, which is, safety." 2 EMERIC DE VATTEL,
THE LAw OF NATIONS, ch. VI, § 71 (Leiden, 1758). The rule that local remedies
must be exhausted before appealing under international law Is examined in detail
in CASTOR P. H. LAW, THE LOCAL REMEDIES RULE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1961).
15. The protection of foreign capital in Africa and Asia was accomplished
through the direct intervention of colonial powers. "Where local governments
were weak and vulnerable, and where property relations had to be radically
restructured, the balancing act was seldom successful... The result, in Africa
and much of Asia, was the inexorable extension of imperial rule in the late
nineteenth century." CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN
CAPITAL IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES 16 (1985). Latin American
states had been nominally independent since the early 1800s, but remained
linked to the European powers through the investment of foreign capital in their
territories. These foreign investments included railroads and port facilities. Id. at
18. See also JOHN H. COATSwORTH, GROWTH AGAINST DEVELOPMENT: THE ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF RAILROADS IN PORFIRIAN MEXICO (1981); RICHARD GRAHAM, BRITAIN AND
THE ONSET OF MODERNIZATION IN BRAZIL 1850-1914 (1972): BUSINESS IMPERIALISM
1840-1930: AN INQUIRY BASED ON BRITISH EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA (D.C.M.
Plat ed., 1977); WINTHROP R. WRIGHT, BRITISH-OWNED RAILWAYS IN ARGENTINA:
THEIR EFFECT ON ECONOMIc NATIONALISM, 1854-1948 (1974).
16. As one author has noted:

In the nineteenth century... interventionary force meant naval force...
[u]ndeveloped states, weak and isolated as they were, could do little to
prevent the successful use of force by Great Britain and other European
powers ....
Port cities could be shelled or occupied without threat of
recrimination . . . . Then, too, foreign investments were located where
naval force could easily protect them. Direct investments were either
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strength of the European powers. 17 Notwithstanding the strength
of the European powers and the need for foreign capital by
underdeveloped territories, the traditional standard was
challenged at the turn of the century by Latin American jurists

and the socialist states of Eastern Europe. 18 The Latin American

opposition to the implications of the traditional law of state
responsibility, developed in the nineteenth century and reinforced
19
in the twentieth, is embodied in the so-called Calvo Doctrine.
situated along the coast, or, like railroads, dependent upon access to the

sea.
LIPSON, supra note 15, at 147. Local interventionary force is still used in the
twentieth century, but it takes the form of covert force or the capacity to mobilize
swiftly for direct military intervention. Id.
17. The financial strength of the United Kingdom and the other European
powers was exercised mostly against Latin American states; usually for the
collection of debt, one European power or the other would invade the Latin
American states. This action has been called "gunboat diplomacy."
18. See Asante, supra note 11, at 589.
19. The Calvo Doctrine, developed by the Argentinean jurist Carlos Calvo, is
discussed in varied forms in the following books: EDwIN M. BORcHARD, THE
DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 795-809 (1915); JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE

LAW OF NATIONS 181-83 (2d ed. 1938); CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 168-76 (1928); CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL

LAw 285-94 (3d ed. 1948); 5 GREEN H. HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
635-54 (1934); PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN Lw OF NATIONS 110-12 (1948); LINDEN
A. MANDER, FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN WORLD SOcIET 562-69 (1947); MATTHEw M.
MCMAHON, CONQUEST AND MODERN INTERNATIONAL Lw 193-97 (1940); 1 LASSA F.
CASES,
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL Lw 312 (1944); THE Lw OF NATIONS:

DOCUMENTS AND NOTES 522-23 (Herbert W. Briggs ed., 1938). This general
principle has subsequently been written into investment contracts and national
constitutions. As a specific constitutional clause, however, its meaning has
varied considerably. Mexico, for instance, excludes diplomatic protection under

any circumstances.

In contrast, Bolivia grants limited rights of diplomatic

protection when justice has been denied. DONALD R SHEA, THE CALvO CLAUSE: A
PROBLEM OF INTERAMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAw AND DIPLOMACY (1955); David E.

Graham, The Calvo Clause: Its Current Status as a Contractual Renunciation of
Diplomatc Protection. 6 TEX. INT'L L. F. 289-90 (1971); Manuel R. G. Mora, The
Calvo Clause In Latin American Constitutions and InternationalLaw, 33 MARQ. L.
REV. 205-19 (1950). Calvo himself wrote extensively on what he considered the
international legal injunctions against foreign intervention, whether diplomatic or
military. "I est impossible de ddcouvrir une seule raison sdrieuse et lgltime qui
puisse justifier jusqu' A un certain point ces ing~rences europdenes dans les
affalres interieures de l'Amerique." And, of course, Calvo argues that local rules
and judicial decisions regarding foreign investment were "affalres interieures." 1
CARLOS CALvO, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 348 (5th ed. 1896); see also EDwIN M.
BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 792-816 (1928); Kurt

Lipstein, The Placeof the Calvo ClauseIn InternationalLaw, 1945 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
130.
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The Calvo Doctrine advocates the position that as a matter of
international law, no state may intervene, diplomatically or
otherwise, to enforce its citizens' private claims in a foreign

state. 20 "[The Latin American response to the international
minimum standard was the doctrine of national treatment."2 1
B.

The Twentieth Century and Emerging Rules for the Protectionof
ForeignDirectInvestment

1.
The Post-World War Period and Emerging Norms Relating to
the New International Economic Order
At the turn of the century, the United States Joined
European powers in safeguarding foreign capital, utilizing
same measures under the same traditional rules. 22
emergence of new states from colonial status after World War

the
the
The
II,2

20. Asante, supra note 11, at 591.
21. Id.
22. The United States endorsed traditional property rules to protect its
foreign capital abroad soon after gaining independence. See generaly J. LLOYD
MECHAM, THE UNITED STATES AND INTER-AMERIcAN SEcURITY

(1961) (discussing the

protection of United States foreign interests abroad); MIRA WILKINS, THE
EMERGENCE OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: AMERcAN BusINESS ABROAD FROM THE
COLONIAL ERA To 1914 (1970) (outlining United States policy with regard to foreign
investment). United States foreign investment grew dramatically during this
period. Although figures are not precise, they indicate about $300 million in
United States investments in 1897, a figure that tripled in the next decade. With
respect to Latin America, United States corporations made nearly one billion
dollars in direct investments between 1897 and 1914. LIPSON, supra note 15, at

58.
23. Decolonization led to the creation of a multitude of new states, radically
different in their economic, cultural, and social make-up from those of Western
Europe. This political independence generated a sense of hope and enthusiasm
among new states-feeling that their entry into the global political arena would
enable them to acquire the means and substance necessary for their rapid
economic development.
This [politicial independencel was conceded throughout much of South
and South-East Asia during the first post-war decade and to many African
and some Caribbean territories by the mid-1960s, though the speed of
withdrawal should not conceal the extreme reluctance with which
Europeans sometimes departed . . . [blut once independent, the new
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and the sustained attempts of these states to assert their
economic independence and restructure their national economies,
led to challenges to both the existing legal principles governing
24
foreign direct investment and the legal rules themselves.

Unable to challenge these traditional rules unilaterally, the
newly independent states and other less developed states joined
forces in multilateral fora, especially the United Nations. 25 To
overcome the grand obstacles of bargaining individually, the
developing states in 1962 created a caucus as a means of
coordinating their views and insuring some degree of solidarity in
Because seventy-seven states
the international arena.
participated in the first meeting of this group in the United
Nations, it came to be known as the Group of 77.2 6 In 1964,
having become sufficiently more numerous to take advantage of
their collective voting strength, the developing states managed to
secure the establishment of the United Nations Conference of
While UNCTAD was
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2 7
states very soon encountered the limits which had been imposed on their
freedom of action by decades of merchantilist management.
CHARLES A. JONES. THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE: A BRIEF HISTORY 9 (1983).
24. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1973)
(for a historical outline of the evolution of the law of state responsibility for the
protection of alien and alien property); S. Azadon Tiewul, The United Nations
Charterof Economic Rights and Duties of States, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 687 (1976);
see generally Oscar Schachter, The Evolving InternationalLaw of Development, 15
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1976).
25. See generally ROBERT W. Cox & HAROLD K. JACOBSON, THE ANATOMY OF
INFLUENCE: DECISION-MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1973); Chadwick F.
Alger & David Hoover, The Feudal Structure of Systems of International
Organ.ilzations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH
ASSOCIATION (IPRA) (General Conference, Varansi, India, 1975); Stanley Hoffmann,
An Evaluationof the United Nations, ln HE PROCESS OF INTERNATONAL ORGANIZATION
71 (Robert S. Wood ed., 1971); Charles E. Rothwell, InternationalOrganizationand
World Politics, In INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: POLITICS & PROCESS (Leland M.
Goodrich & David A. Kay eds., 1973).
26. The Group of 77, although It today has more than 77 members, still has
the same name. This caucusing mechanism has become an important vehicle for
securing and maintaining the cohesion among the Third World states that is
necessary for effective dealing with developed states. See Robert S. Jordan, Why
a IEO?, In THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: DYNAMIC PROCESSES,
CONSTRAINTS, AND OPPORTUNrrIES, supra note 3, at 59.
27. Pressures for change in the rules governing international trade led to the
concerted efforts of the developing states to convene UNCTAD in Geneva in 1964.
UNCTAD itself has generated a considerable amount of secondary literature. A
short account of its founding and first meeting is found in MICHAEL ZEMMIT
CUTAJAR & ALISON FRANKS, THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE (1967).
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designed to serve as a forum in which the newly emergent former

colonies could bargain collectively, with the developed states for
more preferential terms of trade, it also became the forum for the

developing

states

to come

together

to

adopt

a

collective

negotiating strategy2 and to formulate and express a unified
Third World position on matters important to them. The creation
of UNCTAD marked the emergence of economic development as a

major concern of Third World states, with foreign direct
investment inextricably intertwined.
While the eventual comprehensive formulation of the Third

World's claims regarding foreign direct Investment arrived in the
1970s, it was fueled by the expansion of TNCs in the 1960s. A
TNC may be defined as a business enterprise composed of a
parent company and one or more subsidiaries located in two or
more states, organized for the conduct of profitable international
production and provision of goods and services. 29 Characterized
FRIEDEBERG, THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT (1968) (describing the first meeting of UNCTAD); Richard N.
Gardner, The United Nations Conference on Tradeand Development, In THE GLOBAL
PARTNERSHIP 99 (Richard N. Gardner & Max F. Millikan eds., 1968) (for an
excellent description of the formation of UNCTAD); 25 ROBERT S. WALTERS,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: THE USE OF UNCTAD
BY LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 818 (1971)
(describing the political framework of UNCTAD).
28. UNCTAD was designed to serve as a forum wherein the newly
independent former colonies could have a collective voice. See Diego Cordovez,
The Making of UNCTAD, Institutional Background and Legislative History, 3 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 243 (for a discussion of the decision process in UNCTAD). The
institutionalization of UNCTAD has provided a precedent for the creation of
additional bodies under the auspices of the General Assembly of the United
Nations.
29. The term Transnational Corporation (TNC) is used, instead of others
such as multinational corporation or multinational enterprise, because that term
Is in contemporary usage by the United Nations agencies. For example, the 1988
United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations provides the
following explanation:
See also A.S.

The definition of a transnational corporation is designed to cover all
enterprises that operate across national boundaries and in any field of
activity, through affiliates or entities in two or more countries. It is
immaterial whether the enterprise is privately-owned, state-owned, or of
mixed undertaldng. Indeed paragraph 2 [of the Code] provides that, for the
application of the Code, it Is irrelevant whether or not enterprises as
described above are referred to in any country as transnational
corporations:
The intention is thus to ensure that the standards
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by an ability to shift capital and resources, the TNC relies on

technological innovations, which often result in oligopolistic
control of markets.3 0
Although the TNC parent and its
subsidiaries are incorporated under national laws, the extension
of TNC networks
across national boundaries
prevents
municipalities from fully addressing the TNC. 3 1 This inability of
any one state to fully control TNCs, and their status, as major

vehicles for foreign direct investment, made TNCs the source of
much concern for both industrialized and Third World states.
While industrialized states sought to secure stable international
regimes for their TNCs, Third World states feared TNC strategies.
Third World Intellectuals and policymakers focused on the
economic and political power TNCs could wield in developing
states, including their ability to penetrate class structure,
national ideology, and local production bases. 3 2 In addition,
TNCs were criticized as primary perpetuators of extreme economic

embodied in the Code are applicable to all enterprises that operate on a
transnatonal basis. The importance of a linkage between the various
afiliates or entities constituting the whole enterprise is also emphasized,
the main focus being on the existence of a decLsion-making network that
enables one or more entities within the network to exercise signiftcant
Influence over the activities of the others.

The United Nations Code of Conduct on TransnatonalCorporations, at 8, U.N. Doc.
ST/CTC/ser.A/4 (1988) (emphasis added).
30. The TNCs control of advanced technology, together with its managerial
skills, its financial resources, and its ability to take advantage of economies of
scale, permit TNCs to dominate local competition in domestic markets. HENRY J.
STEINER & DETLEv F. VAGTs, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 1178 (2d ed. 1976).

See generally Jurgen Voss, The Protection and Promotion of Foreign Direct
Investment In Developing Countries: Interests, Interdependencles, Intricacies, 31

INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 686 (1982).
31. See RAYMOND VERNON, STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS 1 (1977).
32. Underdevelopment is a historical process of global development of the
international system.
The evolution of this global system of underdevelopment-development has,
over a period of time, given rise to two great polarizations which have
found their main expression in geographical terms. First, a polarization of
the world between countries:
with the developed, industrialized,
advanced, 'central northern' ones on one side, and the underdeveloped,
poor, dependent, and 'peripheral southern' ones on the other.
Osvaldo Sunkel, Transnatlonal Capitalism and National Disintegration In Latin
America, In TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES: THEIR IMPACT ON THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES
AND CULTURES 49, 52 (Krishna Kumar ed., 1980).
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dependence, as well as economic, social, and political
underdevelopment. 3 3
Third World states, suspicious of the impact of foreign direct
investments and TNCs on their societies in general, and economic
development in particular, called for the following changes: (1)
restructuring the system of international organizations; (2)
making reforms in the methods and objectives of international
regulation; and (3) establishing a new international economic
order. 34

33. The Indian economist Sanjaya Lall has classified attitudes against
foreign direct nvestment Into three categories: (1) the nationalist school, which
seeks to limit the excessive profits of TNCs; (2) the dependencia school, typical of
Latin American thinking on the subject, which views continued economic
dependence of the Third World on the United States and Western Europe
primarily as the result of foreign investment; and (3) the Marxist perspective,
which, in addition to its hostility to the privately-owned nature of TNCs, sees the
TNC as a tool of Western imperialism and as a perpetuator of economic
contradictions and divisions on a global scale. See Charles P. Kindleberger, The
Multinational Corporationin a World of Militant Developing Countries, in GLOBAL
COMPANIES: THE POLmCAL ECONOMY OF WORLD BuSINESS 70-71 (George W. Ball ed.,
1975); see generally SAMiR AMiN, AcCUMULATION OF A WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF
THE THEORY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1974); MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOwARDS A NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979); MAGNUS BLOMSTROM & BJORN HETTNE,
DEVELOPMENT THEORY IN TRANSITION (1984); P. EBOW BONDZI-SIMPSON, LEGAL
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HOST STATES (1990);
PETER J. BURNELL, ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN THE THIRD WORLD (1986); DAN W.
NABUDERE, IMPERIALISM, THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION (1977);
Jorge Castaneda. The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of
InternationalLaw, 15 INT'L ORG. 38 (1961).
34. The first call for a new international economic order was made in
connection vith the question of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. In
1952, Chile raised this question during the debate on the Draft International
Covenant on Human Rights. The debate on the right of self-determination elicited
a discussion of economic, social, and political aspects of this right. Somenda K.
Banerjee, The Concept of Permanent Sovereignty Over National Resources: An
Analysts, 8 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 515 (1968). Accordingly, in 1952, the General
Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution on the exploitation of national
resources. Id. at 519. In 1962, the General Assembly of the United Nations
passed the Resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and
Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.97/5/Rev.2, reprinted in
1962 U.N.Y.B. 503-04. On the interpretation and legal implications, see GEORO
SCHWARZENBERGER, ECONOMIC WORLD ORDER 40-49 (1970); Banerjee, supra; James
N. Hyde, Permanent Sovereignty Over National Wealth and Resources, 50 AM. J.
INT'L L. 854 (1956).
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Developing states sought the creation of rules of international
law that would promote rapid economic development by insuring
they received their fair share of benefits accruing from TNCs in
their territories. 3 5 In 1974, using their majority in the United
Nations, these developing states succeeded in passing the United
Nations General Assembly resolutions on 3the
Establishment of a
6
New International Economic Order (NIEO).
The NIEO has three dimensions; political, economic,3 7 and
legal. Politically, the NIEO asserts the primacy of the nationstate.3 8 Pursuant to the principles of the NIEO, the nation-state
is entitled to exercise full and effective control over its resources,
including the right to nationalize foreign assets and other
"conditions and requirements calculated to enhance the dignity
and authority of the nation-state." 39 Economically, the NIEO calls
for "economic justice,"4 ° a restructuring of the global economy
that would promote rapid economic development by guaranteeing
41
developing states their fair share of the world economy.

35. The developing states called for a special session of the General
Assembly of the United Nations ostensibly to discuss the issues of development
and raw materials. At this Sixth Special Session, the developing states called for
the establishment of a New International Economic Order. One of the main
aspects of this objective was to be attained by, among other things, the formation
of producer cartels and the indexation of prices of the exports of developing states
to their imports from the developed states. See United Nations Declarationon the
Establishment of a New InternationalEconomic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N.
GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Agenda Item 7, U.N. Doc. A/Res/3201 (S-VI) (1974),
reprintedIn 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974); Programof Action on the Establishmentof a New
InternationalEconomic Order, GA. Res. 3202 (S-VI). U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess.,
Agenda Item 7, U.N. Doc. A/Res/3202 (S-VI) (1974), reprinted In 13 I.L.M. 720
(1974).
36. Id.
37. See MCCULLOCH, supra note 10; see also INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
STUDIES INSTITUTE, RAw MATERIALS AND FOREIGN POLICY 359 (1976).
38.

See MCCULLOCH, supra note 10.

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS IN HONOUR OF A.J.P.
TAMNEs (H. Meijers & E. W. Venday eds., 1977) (for discussions of the legal effect
of the General Assembly Resolutions); see generally E. LASZLO ET AL., THE
OBiECTIVES OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1978); JOHN A.
MATHIESON, BAsIc NEEDS AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: AN OPENING
FOR NORTH-SOUTH COLLABORATION IN THE 1980s (Overseas Development Council
Working Paper No. 4, May 1981); L. MINIC. THIRD WORLD CHALLENGE (1981).
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One of the key components of the NIEO is the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, 4 2 adopted by the United
Nations in 1974. The Charter of Economic Rights was conceived
originally as the basic framework of fundamental principles for

international economic relations between Third World and
developed states. It advocates the advancement of more rational
and equitable international economic relations, the strengthening
-the economic independence of developing states, and the
necessity for the entire international community to promote
economic and social progress in all states, especially developing
ones .1 3 One of the main principles of the Charter, Article 2 (2),
confers on every state the right to regulate foreign investment,
including the activities of TNCs within its national jurisdiction; it
also confers the right to nationalize alien property upon payment
of adequate compensation."
The Charter thus challenges
traditional principles of customary international law that govern
foreign direct investment, such as determining compensation for
expropriation or nationalization and settling foreign investment
disputes.
Article 2 of the Charter of Economic Rights asserts that the
right to nationalize and the standard of compensation are
governed by domestic laws and policies, not international law.4 5
In this regard, Article 2 has been described as "a classic
restatement" of the Calvo Doctrine. 46 While the industrialized
states do not object to the developing states asserting their rights
to nationalize or to expropriate foreign property, they have
expressed substantial concern over the issue of compensation.
Industrialized states, particularly the United States, have urged
full and adequate compensation for any expropriated party.4 7
42. Charterof Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A Res. 3281, U.N.
GAOR 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975). reprinted In 14
I.L.M. 251 (1975) [hereinafter Charterof Economic Rights].
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See MCCULLOCH, supra note 10, at 360.

47. For the United States, the correct standard is "prompt, adequate, and effective compensation" which, for most United States investors, means "fair market
value paid in freely transferable dollars." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 166, 185 (1965). Generally, the traditional
position of industrialized states on expropriation Is that the taking by a state of
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Third World states, while not denying payment of compensation,
insist that the decision should rest solely with the expropriating
state in accordance with its national laws or policies. 4s
If a dispute arises from the sovereign exercise of
nationalization, expropriation, or over any foreign investment
matter, Article 2 of the Charter of Economic Rights provides that
the dispute be resolved in accordance with the national judicial or
arbitral procedures. 49 Industrialized states have opposed this
position; they argue that the appropriate approaches are the

settlement of foreign investment disputes, international
arbitration, or adjudication.r ° The proposition of an independent

international authority for the resolution of investment disputes,
which has been challenged by Latin American states since the

alien property is wrongful under international law if any of the following
conditions exist: (1) it is not for a public purpose; (2) it is discriminatory; or (3)
provision is not made for the payment of prompt, adequate, and effective
GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND INTERcompensation.
NATIONAL LAw 4 (1969).
48. In this regard, some developing states have claimed that they are

obligated to pay only the book value of the foreign Investment, which is the
original cost less any depreciation. See Don C. Piper, New Directions in the
Protection of American-owned Property Abroad, 4 INT'L TRADE L.J. 323. 325-30
(1979). Certain developing host states consider the justification for requiring
compensation to be the elimination of unjust enrichment to the expropriating
state, rather than the duty to give the investor the value of the expropriated
property. See Eduardo J. de Arechaga, State Responslbllltyfor the Nationalization
of Foreign Owned Property, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 179, 181-83 (1978).
What makes the'principle of unjust enrichment highly relevant in the field
of nationalizations is its equitable foundation, which makes it necessary to
take into account all the circumstances of each specific situation and to
balance the claims of the dispossessed alien with the undue advantages
that he may have enjoyed prior to nationalization... [it) requires that the
undue enrichment acquired by foreign companies during a period of
monopoly or of highly privileged economic position, as, for instance,
during a period of colonial domination ....
Eduardo J. de Arechaga, Applicatlon of the Rules of State Responsibility to the
Nationalization of Foreign-Owned Property, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 220, 223 (Kamal Hossain ed., 1980).

49.

See Charter of Economic Rights, supra note 42. Developing states have

argued that compensation should take into account the ability of the host state to
pay. Piper, supra note 48, at 323.
50. See JONES, supra note 23. at 1-3.
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end of the nineteenth century,5 1 generally has been rejected by
52
Third World states.
2.

The Aftermath

The so-called North-South dialogue,5 3 a phrase coined in the
1970s to describe the necessary framework for negotiations
between Third World and industrialized states in the aftermath of
the adoption of the NIEO and Charter of Economic Rights, now
has been referred to as the "North-South stalemate."" Although

the United Nations has respected the spirit of the declaratory
principles of the Charter, particularly by establising the
Commission on Transnational Corporations to deal with issues
concerning TNCs, 55 very few results have been realized. Third
51. See Aron Broches, The Experience of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DIsPUTEs:
AVOIDANCE AND SnmrLEMENT 75 (Seymour J. Rubin & R. Nelson eds., 1985).
52. See Alden F. Abbott, Latin America and International Arbitration
Conventions: The Quandary of Non-Ratificatton, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 131, 137
(1976). The Calvo Doctrine maintains that "aliens are only entitled to those legal
rights and privileges enjoyed by nationals, and hence may seek redress for
grievances only before local authorities and to the extent permitted by local law."
Id. As a result, Latin American states held firmly to the position that 'disputes
involving a Latin state, including arbitrations to which a state Is a party, must be
adjudicated in accordance with local law." Id.
53. See JONES, supra note 23, at 1.
54. See generally Id. at 81-114.
55. The United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations (CTNC)
has Its origins in E.S.C. Res. 1721, U.N. ESCOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N.
Doc. E/52-a (1972), which requested the Secretary General to establish a Group
of Eminent Persons to study the effects of TNCs on world development and
international relations.
In the report, the Group of Eminent Persons
recommended the creation of a commission on transnational corporations
attached to the ECOSOC that would work, inter ala, to develop both specific and
more general arrangements dealing with TNCs. Report of the Group of Eminent
Persons, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on
InternationalRelations, U.N. Doc. E/5300/Rev. I, ST ESA/6, at 55 (1974). The
CTNC was established pursuant to E.S.C. Res. 1913, U.N. ESCOR, 57th Sess..

Supp. No. IA, U.N. Doc. E/5570/add. 1 (1976). CTNC Is composed of forty-eight

members, and member-states are elected from the following regional groupings:
twelve from Africa; eleven from Asia; ten from Latin America; ten from Western
Europe. North America, and Oceania; and five from Eastern Europe. Id. In terms
of its agenda to date, three issues have received extensive attention from the
CTNC: (1) the formulation of the code of conduct on TNCs; (2) the activities of
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World states have made various attempts in multilateral fora to

introduce new legal norms to govern foreign investment and
technology transactions to safeguard their economic interests."6
To achieve this end, Third World states have vigorously pursued
the creation of international agreements and codes of conduct to
regulate the activities of TNCs. 57 The various international and
regional efforts at creating a multilateral system for the regulation
of TNCs stem from concern regarding the negative aspects of their
operations. Moreover, the Third World has recognized that
is
national regulation, unaided by some international mechanism,
8
clearly inadequate to deal with the global strategies of TNCs.5
The 1980s witnessed a substantial decline in the flow of
direct and indirect investment to Third World states. Specifically,
gross foreign direct investment declined during this period from
$13 billion in 1981 to $9.5 billion in 1986; in 1987, however, it
returned to the 1981 level.5 9 The pre-1987 decline was due
partially to the perception by industrialized states, especially the
United States, that the legal standards for the protection of
foreign investment in developing states were unstable6° following
the Third World's call for a NIEO. Consequently, TNCs from
TNCs in South Africa and Namibia; and (3) the role of transnational banks in the
international economy.
See P. EBON BONDZI-SIMPSON, LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HOST STATES (1990).
56. See Timothy W. Stanley, International Codes of Conduct for MNC's: A
Skeptical View of the Process, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 973, 974 (1981).
57. Id.
58. In 1970, the International Court of Justice. in the famous case of The
Barcelona Traction Company (Belgium v. Spain), acknowledged the lack of
international law in this area:
Considering the important developments of the first half century, the
growth of foreign investments, the expansion of the international activities
of corporations [in particular of holding companies] which are often
multinational, and the way in which the economic interests of states have
proliferated, it may at first sight appear surprising that the evolution of law
has not gone further and that no generally accepted rules in the matter

have crystallized on the international plane.

Barcelona Traction Company (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 46-47 (1970).
59. See Malcolm D. Rewat, MultilateralApproaches to Improving the Investment Climate of Developing Countries: The Cases of ICSID and MIEA. 33 HARv.
INT'L L. J. 102 (1992).
60. Some theorists have argued that this lack of a truly international system
for TNCs has deprived these corporations of their ability "to pursue 'the true logic
of the global economy.'" George Ball, Cosmocorp: The Importance of Being
Stateless, 6 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 25 (1967).
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developed home states invested in other developed states rather
than Third World states.
By the mid-1980s Third World states with an increased need
for capital, and left with few other financial alternatives, began
negotiating bilateral investment treaties (BITS) with developed

states.61 Although the BIT movement began slowly, and failed to

attract the most developed of the Third World states, such as
62
Mexico, it has grown tremendously in the last decade.

The BIT movement has removed the North-South issue of

foreign direct investment and TNC operations from the
multilateral fora. Developed states, greatly outnumbered in the
multilateral fora, have sought instead to structure stable
International environments for foreign direct investment that
reaffrmed the traditional principles of customary international
law governing the protection of alien property.6
The political
unwillingness of industrialized states to address the issue of
international regulation of foreign direct investment and TNCs on
a united basis has nearly forced Third World states to utilize the
61. The first BIT was signed between the Federal Republic of Germany and
Pakistan in 1959. Athena J. Pappas, References on Bilateral Investment Treaties,
4 INT'L CENTRE SETTLEMENT INvESTMENT DISP. (ICSID) REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J.

189, 189 (1989). By 1991, there were more than three hundred treaties
involving, among them, nearly all the Western industrialized states and over
ninety developing states. Mohamed I. Khalfl, Treatment of Foreign Investment In
BilateralInvestment Treaties, 7 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INvEsTMiENT L.J. 339 (1992).
62. For a discussion the United States BIT movement, see Kenneth J.
Vandevelde, U.S. BilateralInvestment Treaties:The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 621, 622 (1993); see also Jeswald W. Salacuse. BIT by BIT: The Growth of
BilateralInvestment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment In Developing
Countries,24 INT'L LAW 655 (1990).
63. Salacuse, supra note 62, at 659-60. Selacuse adds:
[Tihe BIT movement as a whole may be seen as part of an ongoing process
to create a new international law of foreign Investment to respond to the
demands of the new global economy that has so rapidly emerged within
the last few years ....
Although BITs themselves only bind the two
countries concerned and are probably not sufficiently widespread to
constitute customary international law, the process of study, consultation,
discussion, and negotiation that has been part of the BIT movement has
certainly laid a foundation for the creation of an international investment
framework that may eventually attract the consensus of the nations of the
world.
Id. at 675.
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constraints of the old international economic order. International
arrangements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)64 and the International Monetary Fund6 5 have
facilitated the flow of foreign investment and the development of
TNCs. International minimum standards of state responsibility
have protected these entities,as thereby eroding the gains of the
NIEO and the Charter of Economic Rights.
III. MEXICO: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 1910-1993

A. HistoricalRole of ForeignDirectInvestment in Mexico: An
Overview

Foreign direct investment first assumed a major role in
Mexico's economy during the administration of Porfirio Diaz
The ascendance to power of President Diaz
(1876-1911).67
brought to Mexico the political stability of a thirty-four year
dictatorship and liberal economic policies that welcomed foreign

investment.68 Believing that substantial investments in mining,
utilities, and basic industries would bring Mexico into an
economic position commensurate with that of industrialized
states, this administration established a deliberate policy for
64. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, T.IA.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
65. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Is a major force In promoting
market-oriented policy reforms and reducing poverty in those states making the
transition to market economies. Kim Reisman, The World Bank and the IMF: At
The Forefrontof World Transformation,60 FORDHAM L. REv. 340 (1992).
66. Traditional principles of customary international law relating to
investments revolve around the law of state responsibility for injury to aliens and
alien property-this international minimum standard was developed in the
nineteenth century. See Asante, supra note 11, at 590.
67. Although the conquest by Spain of the Aztecs had signaled the
importance of the international economy and the external sector in the economic
history in Mexico, foreign investment truly assumed a major role in Mexico only
during the administration of Porfirio Diaz.
68. By the 1880s substantial amounts of capital began to flow into Mexico
from Great Britain and the United States, especially in the areas of production
and transportation of primary commodities, mostly minerals. As a result of these
investments, the Mexican railroad system grew to a network of over 12,000 miles
by 1910. See ROGER D. HANSEN, THE POLmcs OF ME.CAm DEVELOPMENT 17 (1971).
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attracting foreign investment. 69 President Diaz and the clentfflcos
embraced an interpretation of economic liberalism that led the
Mexican government to open the door to foreign capital. 70 At the
end of the so-called Pofirato, foreign investments poured into
railroad construction, mining, public utilities, real estate,
banking, manufacturing, and commerce. 7 1 The Mexican economy
thrived on exports of primary products, with communications and
other infrastructure designed to serve the needs of the mostly
foreign owned export companies. 7 2 Although actual figures are

69. See HISTORIA MODERNA DE MtxCo EL PORFIRIATO: VIDA ECON6MIcA (Daniel
Cosio Villegas ed., 1965) (outlining Mexico's economic growth during the
administration of Porfirio Dfaz). Foreign investment in Mexico, both direct and
indirect, in 1911 has been estimated at United States $1,700 million, of which
between $650 million and $1,045 million came from the United States. HARRY K.
WRIGHT, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN MExico 53 (1971). "Whatever the actual figures, it
appears that by the end of the Diaz era foreigners probably owned over half of the
total wealth of the country and that foreign capital dominated every area of
productive enterprise except agriculture and the handicraft industries." Id.
(citations omitted). See generally LEOPOLDO SOLIS, LA REALIDAD ECON6MICA
MEmcANA: RETRovIsi6N Y PERSPECTiVAS 47 (1981) (discussing the history of
Mexico's economic growth).
70. See WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 52. The "clentfftlcos" were a group of
highly educated and modern government managers, who were convinced of the
need to achieve economic growth and development through foreign investment.
"In the clentfflcos interpretation of progress, foreign investors supplied the
entrepreneurial spirit and the financing that Mexicans lacked in the short run...
a program of incentives and promotion of foreign investment was created, and
confidence was thus maintained for both national and foreign investors." ROBERT
G. NEWELL & Luis F. ROBIO, MExIco's DILEMMA: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF ECONOMIC
CRISIS 15 (1984).
71. Foreign investment was particularly significant in railroad construction
and mining, and, to a lesser degree, in public utilities. WRIGHT, supra note 69, at
53. Direct foreign Investment, especially North American and British, was
oriented principally toward the production and transportation of primary
commodities for the export market. Id. "Porfiriato" is the term used to refer to the
administration of President Porfirio Diaz (1876-1911).
72. VAN R. WITING, JR., THE POLITICAL EONOMY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN

MEXICO 59 (1992). In the nineteenth century, foreign Investment in Mexico, both
direct and indirect, came from Western Europe as well as from the United States,
"but by the turn of the century, as the United States embarked upon its
imperialist adventures in the Caribbean, investment by the United States had
begun to predominate." Id. In 1897, thirty-eight percent of all foreign investment
in Mexico was from the United States, and twenty-nine percent of all United
States foreign investment (direct and indirect) was in Mexico. Most of these
investments were in mining and railroads. See Comlt6 Bilateral de Hombres de
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not available, recent studies suggest that by the end of the
Poifirlato, foreigners owned over half of the total wealth of Mexico
and foreign capital dominated most areas of productive
enterprise. 7 3
The presence of foreign investors during the PorfirLato7 4 was
largely to blame for many of Mexico's economic ills at the
beginning of this century and fueled the Mexican Revolution of
1910. 7 6 The Revolution established the ideological and political
foundation for a fundamentally different state role in the Mexican

economy. 76 The new boundaries for the role of the Mexican state
were established in the Mexican Constitution of 1917, which
placed restraints on foreign economic activities and foreign land
ownership.7 7 By incorporating the anti-foreign sentiments of the
Mexican revolutionaries, the Mexican Constitution emphasized
Mexican sovereignty and independence from foreign economic
control.
For more than sixty years, the interventionist, nationalist
Mexican state, created by the Mexican Constitution, contributed
significantly to the regulation of foreign direct investment in
Mexico. Indeed, foreign direct investment provided the most
direct challenge for state policy during this so-called nationalist
period.78 Yet the Mexican policymakers were able to meet these
Negoclos, MdxIco-Estados Unldos, Inversiones ExtranJeras Privadas Directas en
Mexico 77-81 (Mddico: Comitd Bilateral, 1971).
73. WHITINo, supra note 72, at 59. "[By the end of the Dfaz era, foreigners
probably owned over half of the total wealth of the country and . . . foreign
enterprise dominated every areas of productive enterprise except agriculture and
the handicraft industries." Id. See also WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 54. See supra
notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
74. See COATSWORTH, supra note 15, at 95-114.
75. See NORA HAMILTON, THE LIMITS OF STATE AUTONOMY: POST-REVOLUTIONARY
ME=XCO 3 (1982) ("The [Rievolution of 1910 destroyed the pre-existing state
apparatus and enabled the revolutionary leadership to form a new state within
the context of structural options resulting from .Mexico's prior development as
well as new forces, alliances, and conflicts emerging from the revolution itself.").
76. "The ideals and aims that emerged during ten years of civil
struggle-emancipation of the rural and laboring classes and recovery of the
country's economic destiny-have been basic to the philosophy of every
administration since that time." WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 61.
77. See CONSTrTUcION POLrTCA DE Los ESTADOS MEXCAmOS (1917), reprintedIn
CONSTrrUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gilbert H.
The Constitution promulgated
Flanz eds. 1988) [hereinafter MEx. CONST.1.

February 5, 1917, has been in effect, with significant amendments, ever since.
78. See WHITING, supra note 72, at 55. Whiting refers to this period as the
"nationalist vision" or "metapreference." He maintains that one of the main
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challenges by choosing new policy instruments as new problems
with foreign direct investment were identified.7 9
Until the
economic debt crisis of 1982, Mexico was able to structure a
pattern of state action that was not irrational "nor did it reflect
passive submission to the preferences of foreign investors."8 0
The evaluation of Mexico's strength and endurance regarding
foreign direct investment requires familiarity with the history of
Mexican economic development in general and foreign direct
investment in particular. From Mexico's economic development
strategies of primary product exports"' to import substituting

industrialization,8 2 the Mexican state has intervened in the
process of Mexico's economic development, and much of that
8
intervention has been against the interests of foreign capital. 3
The result of this interventionist state action Is that, although
Mexico continues to be one of the largest foreign direct investment
hosts among developing states, foreign investment has been
limited to those sectors defined by the Mexican government.
Foreign direct investment in Mexico has increased steadily since
1940 and rapidly since 1960, as global investment has grown. 8 4
aspects of this nationalist metapreference for local ownership was "foreign
ownership to complement nationally owned Industries and to produce what state
and domestic private firms could not." Id.
79. Id. at 53.
80. Id.
81. The overall growth of the Mexican economy during the thirty-four years
of the Diaz administration was reflected in the performance of the state's external
sector. Between 1877 and 1910 the value of Mexican exports increased by more
than 600%. See MIGUEL D. RAMIREZ, MEXICO'S ECONOMIC CRISIS: ITS ORIGIN AND
CONSEQUENCES 17 (1989).
82. Import substituting industrialization, the Mexican model for economic
development during 1940-1970, called for the development of industry to produce
what had formerly been imported. This economic strategy is attributed to
"transforming Mexico from a backward rural economy into one of the industrial
giants of the developing world." Id. at 41-43. However, it also "exacerbated
existing structural weaknesses endemic to the Mexican economy" and thus paved
the way for future economic crises. Id. at 41.
83. WHITING, supra note 72, at 53.
84. Mexico is among the developing states that have received the most
foreign investment; from 1955 to 1982, net foreign direct investment reached
almost $113.5 billion (United States dollars). See WILSoN P. NufEz, FOREIGN
DIRECT INvESmENT AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN MEXIco (1990). At the end of
1991, the United States was Mexico's dominant foreign investor, with sixty-three
percent of cumulative foreign direct investment in Mexico; Germany was ranked

second with approximately six percent, and Canada's share of Mexico's
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Nevertheless, Mexico's share of global foreign direct investment
has diminished steadily.8 5 In comparison to other states, despite
its high ranking among developing states, Mexico's dependence on
88
foreign direct investment is only average.
B. The ConstitutionalContext
The 1917 Mexican Constitution s 7 embodies the principles of

the Mexican Revolution of 1910, 88 including sovereignty and
independence from foreign, economic, and political control. The
modernization of Mexico during the Porfirlato,8 9 based on
integration in the world market and foreign control of vital sectors
of the economy, created a dependent economic structure that
limited the Mexican government's control over these sectors, and
consequently hampered its ability to direct economic
development. 9 ° By the early twentieth century, the economic
cumulative foreign direct investment was less than two percent. See REPORT TO
THE HONORABLE RIcHARD A. GEPHARDT, MAJORITY LEADER, AND TO THE HONORABLE
STANDER LEVIN, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT, UNITED STATES-MEXICAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT DATA (Sept. 25, 1992)
[hereinafter GEPHARDT REPORT].
85. GEPHARDT REPORT, supra note 84.

86.

Id.

87. MEX. CONST., supra note 77. References to the Mexican Constitution are
to the Constitution of 1917, which replaced the Constitution of 1857, signed at
Queretaro on January 31, 1917. The Mexican Constitution has been subject to
numerous amendments.
88. Wilkie points out that the Revolution of 1910 prescribed the program of
state-directed integration of Mexican social and economic life. See JAMES W.
WILKIE, THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION: FEDERAL EXPENDITURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE SINCE
1910 (1970).
"The ideals and aims that emerged during ten years of civil
struggle-emancipation of the rural and laboring classes and recovery of the
country's economic destiny-have been basic to the philosophy of every
administration since that time." WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 61. There are
numerous books on the Mexican Revolution of 1910. For an account of the
Revolution in the context of Mexican-United States relations during that period,

see HOwARD F. CLuNE, THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 113-213 (1963).
89. See generally Luis N. d'Olwer et al., El Poatirlato: La VIda Economlca. In 7
HISTORIA MODERNA DE MEXICO 973-1185 (Daniel C. Villegas ed., 1965).
90. During the period spanned by the regime of Porfirio Diaz (1876-1911), it
was believed that substantial investments in mining, utilities, and basic
industries would bring Mexico into a position commensurate with that of
industrialized states. Direct and indirect foreign investment in Mexico in 1911
has been estimated at United States $1,700 million, of which between $650
million and $1,045 million was from the United States. See WRIGHT, supra note
69. "Whatever the actual figures, it appears that by the end of the Diaz era
foreigners probably owned over half of the total wealth of the country and that
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penetration of Mexico by foreign enterprises triggered a growing
fear of increasing foreign influence. 9 1 In response to this fear, the
Mexican Constitution established the framework for a strong

interventionist state92 and reserved to it exclusive control over the
These constitutional principles
Mexican economic system. 93
support the restrictive Mexican economic policy toward foreign
continues
investment that predominated until a decade ago9 and
4
today.
development
economic
to influence Mexico's
The Mexican Constitution divides the enactment and
investment policy implementation authority between the Mexican
Congress and the Federal Chief Executive (Executive).9 5 Article
73 empowers Congress to encourage the promotion of Mexican
investment and regulation of foreign investment. 9 6 Article 89
compels the Executive to see that laws passed by the Congress
are faithfully executed. 9 7 Amendments to the Constitution in
foreign capital dominated every area of productive enterprise except agriculture
and the handicraft industries." Id. (Citations omitted). While foreign capital
multiplied the resources of the national government and facilitated the
centralization of power, it limited the government's control over these resources
and thus the ability to direct economic development. President Porfirio Diaz
attempted to modify the dependent economic structure through such measures
as partial nationalization of the railroads, and to offset the increasing
preponderance of United States interests by encouraging European investment.
See HAMILTON, supra note 75, at 51-52; see also John H. Coatsworth, Los Orfgenes
del AutoritarismoModerno en Mdx/co, In XVI, 2 (62) FoRo INTERNACIONAL 205, 207.
91. Many of these enterprises were mineral companies which are still
operating today, notably America Smelting & Refining, Cananea Consolidated
Copper, the Fresnillo Company, and Companla Minera de Penoles.
92. The final draft of the Mexican Constitution called for an interventionist
state over a broad spectrum of activities, expanding the functions of the Mexican
state to encompass measures to secure national sovereignty over natural

resources, the access of peasant communities to land, and the rights of labor.
See HAMILTON, supra note 75, at 37-38; see also WHmTNG, supra note 72, at 61.
93. Articles 25, 26, and 28 of the Mexican Constitution establish the
foundation for the economic, political, and social structure of the state. MEX.
CONST., supra note 77. These articles define the role of the Mexican state in the
economy. Julio C. Trevifio, Mexico: The Present Status of Legislation and
Government Policies on DirectForeignInvestments, 18 INT'L LAW. 297, 299 (1984).
94. Whiting maintains that the Mexican Constitution "provided the
parameters not only for foreign investment regulation specifically but also for
state intervention in the economy more generally." WmTiNG, supra note 72, at 61.
95. MEX. CONST., supra note 77, art. 73, § XXIX-F, art. 79.
96. MEx. CONST., supra note 77, art. 73, § XXIX-F.
97. Article 89 grants the Executive the power "Itlo promulgate and execute
the laws enacted by ... Congress providing for their exact enforcement in the
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1983 further expanded the broad system of government powers to
direct the national economic development. 98 These amendments,
which were a response to Mexico's economic crisis in 1982, 9 9
permit the Mexican government to adopt broad measures in
economic matters and to reorient the principles governing the
actions of the state and private individuals. °° In recent years,
these measures have emphasized the role of private investment as
the catalyst for economic development." I L Accordingly, the
Mexican government has actively promoted foreign direct
investment as a critical element of its plans for the future growth
of the Mexican economy.
Articles 27 and 28 of the Mexican Constitution have set the
foundation for most government regulation in the area of foreign
administrative sphere." MEX. CONST., supra note 77, art. 89(). In addition to
indirect control over the legislative process, the President has authority to enact
general rules in the form of regulations, which explain and supply detailed
precepts for the application of specific laws. See WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 16-17.
Most statutes are supplemented by regulations. Regulatory provisions may not
contradict those of the correlative statute and therefore are subordinate.
Promulgation and publication are made in the same manner as statutes, and the

enactment of a regulation takes the form of a decree. Id. Although the political
structure of Mexico is beyond the scope of this Article, a few basic principles are

essential for an understanding of the legislative process. Mexico has only one
primary political party, commonly referred to as the PRI (Partido Revolucionario
Institucional). The PRI (or its predecessors) has elected every President, the
overwhelming majority of governors, and most positions in the Congress, as well
as state and local governments. See MARTIN C. NEEDLER, MEXIcAN PoLmcs: THE
CoNTANMENT OF CoNFLICT 86-90 (1982); see also MARVINALISKY, THE GOVERNORS OF
MEmco (1965); PABLO G. CASANOVA. LA DEMOCRACIA EN Mtxco (1964).
98. Amendments to the Constitution, approved Feb. 2. 1983, reprinted in
Federal Official Gazette, D.O., Feb. 3. 1983 (amending arts 16, 25, 27 (§§ XIX,
XX), 28, 73 (§§ XXIX-A, XXIX-E, XXIX-F) of the Mexican Constitution); see also
Jost FRANcisco Ruiz MAsiEu & DIEGo VALDES, NuEvo DERECHO CONSTITUcIONAL
MEXmcANo 502-04 (1983) (comparing actual and original text of Constitution).
99. See tnfra notes 196-208 and accompanying text.
100. Amendments to the Constitution, approved Feb. 2, 1983, reprinted In
Federal Official Gazette, Feb. 3, 1983 (amending arts. 16, 24, 26, 27 (§§ XIX, XX),
28, 73, 29D, 29E & 29F of the Mexican Constitution). "The constitutional
amendments... create a broad system of powers in the Congress and especially
in the Federal Chief Executive, and permit the federal government to plan and
carry out all the strategy of development of the country in accordance with the
National Plan for Development." Trevifio, supra note 93, at 299 (citing MEx.
CONST. arts. 25 and 25, as amended).
101. "In accordance with amended Article 26 of the Constitution, the
government has insisted that its economic planning be democratically planned
based on popular consultations with interested parties." Trevifio, supra note 93,
at 299 n.11.
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These Articles largely are
Article 27 has three very

important provisions that have impacted the regulation of foreign
investment in Mexico: (1) national sovereignty over national
resources, (2) the implementation of the "Calvo Clause"1 0 2 and, (3)
the formation of the so-called "Restricted Zone."1 0 3 Article 27
vests land ownership, water, and subsoil rights in the Mexican

state and gives the state the right to regulate the use of national
resources to preserve and ensure a more equitable distribution of

public wealth. 10

Section I of Article 27 further vests only

Mexican nationals with the right to own land, waters, and their
The Mexican state may grant the same
appurtenances.10 5

ownership rights to foreigners if they agree to consider themselves
nationals with respect to the property and promise not to invoke

the protection of their governments.
results in

Violation of this agreement

forfeiture of the property.

This "Calvo Clause" is

required not only in all cases in which property is purchased by a
foreigner, but also in all contract concessions with the Mexican

government.10

6

Article 27 specifically prohibits foreign ownership of land
within a zone of one hundred kilometers along the borders and

102. Mexico excludes diplomatic protection under any circumstances. See
David E. Graham, The Calvo Clause: Its Current Status as a Contractual
Renunciation of Diplomattc Protection, 6 TEx. INT'L L.J. 289 (1971); Manuel R. G.
Mora, The Calvo Clause in Latin American Constitutionsand InternationalLaw, 33
MARQ. L.R. 205 (1950); see generally, DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE: A
PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY (1955): see also
THE SECRET WAR IN MEXcO:

EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE MEXICAN

REVOLUTION (1981); and supra note 15 and accompanying text.
103. See MEx. CONST., supranote 77, ch. I, art. 27.
104. "The nation shall at all times have... the right to regulate the utilization
of natural resources ... In order to conserve them and to ensure that there Is a
more equitable distribution of public wealth." Id. ch. I art. 27.
105. Id- ch. I, art. 27, § 1.
106. The Article reads:
The State may grant the same right to foreigners [to acquire ownership of
lands, vraters, and their appurtenances], provided they agree... to consider
themselves as nationals in respect to such property, and bind themselves
not to invoke the protection of their governments in matters relating
thereto under penalty, in case of noncompliance with this agreement, of
forfeiture of the property acquired to the Nation.
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fifty kilometers along the shores.1 0 7
This is the so-called
"Restricted Zone." 0 8
Article 28 expressly reserves exclusive
control by the Mexican government of "strategic" sectors of the
economy.'L 9
These sectors now include oil exploration, oil
refining and pipelines, other hydrocarbons, radioactive materials,
electricity, basic petrochemicals,
mail,
satellite telecommunications, and railways. 11 0 In the 1920s and 1930s these
Articles induced a series of government expropriations in the
energy, transportation, and agricultural sectors, which deterred
most foreign investment in the Mexican economy for many
11

years.
The recovery of Mexico's "economic destiny," one of the main
ideals to emerge during the Revolution of 1910, was reflected in
the Mexican Constitution. Until recently, these ideals remained
an important component of every Mexican administration. The

constitutional constraints on foreign economic activities and
foreign land ownership dictated the role of foreign investment in

Mexico for more than seventy years.
C. Liberalism v. Nationalism: The Mexican Model of Development

The Mexican nationalization of the United States and Britishowned oil industry in 1938112 was significant for both domestic
and international reasons.
Domestically, the Mexican oil
nationalization constituted the core of what became Mexico's
national policy toward foreign direct investment and its impact on
economic development for most of this century. This policy
mandated active participation by the state as a "countervailing

107. "Under no circumstances may foreigners acquire direct ownership of

lands or waters within a zone of one hundred kilometers along the frontiers and of
fifty kilometers along the shores of the country." Id.
108. See MEX. CONST., supra note 77, ch. I, art. 27.
109. Id. ch. I, art. 28.

110. Id.
111. See WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 62-66.
112. The story of Mexican oil expropriation has been documented in
numerous books. For a well-documented summary of the account, see WENDELL
C. GORDON, THE EXPROPRIAON OF FOREIGN-OWNED PROPERTY INMEXIco (1941). For
an account of the Mexican viewpoint, see JEsus S. HERZoG, HISTORIA DE LA
EXPROPIACION DE LAws EMPRESAS PEROLERAS (1964) (the author is a member of the
Commonwealth appointed by the federal board of conciliation and arbitration).

See also WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 68-70.
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force to both foreign investors and their home governments." 1 13
Internationally, -the Mexican nationalization of a basic natural
resource proved that a less developed state could take control of a
key economic sector, previously controlled by foreign capital, in
order to control its economy and economic development. 11 4
The Revolution of 1910 had no damaging impact on the
Mexican petroleum industry, which by 1921 was predominantly
foreign-owned and the second largest in the world. 11 5 The
foreign-owned oil companies largely escaped damage because of

their location along the Mexican coastline. 116

Stimulated by

wartime demand, the oil companies substantially expanded their
production during the Revolution. 11 7
The oil industry was
affected, however, by the demands for social justice, land reform,
and control over natural resources espoused by those who
1 18
opposed the foreign investment policies of the PorJiriato.

113. WHIING, supra note 72, at 56. Whiting maintains that the state
intervened in Mexico in the process of economic development all along, and that
the intervention was against the interests of foreign capital. Id. at 57. This state
intervention, sometimes referred to as "economic nationalism" has been explained
by many economic theorists, but most predominantly in Latin America by the
dependlstas or the Dependency theory. There are numerous books on the
Dependency Theory; probably the most noteworthy is FERNANDO H. CARDOSO &
ENzo FALETTO. DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (M.M. Urquido
trans., 1979). See generally HELIO JAGUARIBE ET AL., LA DEPENDENCIA POLmCOECONOMICA DE AMERICA LATINA (1970).
114. As one writer noted, the nationalization of oil "altered the perceptions
and subsequent relationships between host countries and foreign investors."
PAUL E. SIGMUND, MULTINATIONALS IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE POLITIcs OF
NATIONALIZATION 48 (1980). See also DIEGO G. L6PEZ, PROBLEMAS ECON6MICAS DE
MExICO (1970).
115. See WRIGHT, supra note 69. at 62.
116. Id.
117. The decline in United States activity during the early part of the
twentieth century occurred in part attributable to the uncertainty caused by
World War I. Between 1911 and 1926, the only significant increase in foreign
investment in Mexico was in the petroleum sector. The foreign investment in this
sector jumped significantly from 1911 to 1926, especially United States
investment which jumped from $20 million (United States dollars) in 1911 to
$206 million in 1929. See WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 54.
118. SIGMUND, supra note 114, at 51. In 1884, Mexico adopted a new mining
code that included a provision stipulating that "petroleum and gaseous springs"
were to be the "exclusive property of the owner of the land;" subsequent
legislation confirmed the 1884 law. Id. at 50. This legislation, enacted to promote
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Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, which established

Mexico's direct ownership of all subsurface mineral deposits and
abolished private property rights in petroleum deposits, was seen

as a threat by oil companies to their established property
rights.1 19 The United States oil companies enlisted the support of
the United States embassy to buttress their position. 120 By 1923,
the United States government reached an agreement with Mexico

that protected foreign properties and assured compensation for
Specifically, Mexico promised that
any expropriated land.121
had engaged
Article 27 would not be applied to oil companies12that
2

in "positive acts" in developing their properties.

During the 1920s and 1930s the Mexican government
attempted to negotiate with the foreign-owned oil companies on

issues of taxation, drilling permits, and the replacement of fee
simple titles by concessions. 122

The oil companies refused to

negotiate on any of these issues and continuously sought the
support of diplomatic representatives to bolster their position.
The United States diplomats considered it their duty under
international law to extend diplomatic protection to the property
of their nationals abroad.1 2

economic development by promoting foreign investment, allowed British and
United States investors to develop the Mexican oil industry. Id. at 51.
119. The Mexican Constitution of 1917 eliminated the mining laws enacted
during the administration of Porfirlo Diaz. See WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 63.
120. The United States embassy sought assurances from President Carranza
that the provisions of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution would not be applied
retroactively. See SIGMUND, supra note 114, at 52-53. While the embassy made a
lot of threats, the most significant one was armed intervention. Id. at 53. See
also LORENZO MEYER, MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE OIL CONTROVERSY 19171942 69-70 (Mariel Vasconcellos trans., 2d ed. 1977); Clifford Trow, Woodrow
Wilson and the Mexican Interventionist Movement of 1919. 1 J. AM. HIsT. 46
(1971).
121. See LIPSON, supra note 15, at 77.
122. See SIGMUND, supra note 114, at 53. The Bucareli Accords, signed in
1923, were entered into as a condition for United States recognition of the
government of President Alvaro Obregon. Id. The official United States record of
these conferences is U.S. DEPT OF STATE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATESSee
MEXICAN COMMISSION CONVENED IN MEXCO CITY, May 14, 1923 (1925).
generally HOWARD F. CLINE, THE UNITED STATES AND MEXIcO (1971) (discussing the
expropriation of the oil industry in 1989 in the context of United States-Mexican
relations); ANTONIO GOMEZ ROBLEDO, THE BuCARELI AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Salomon de la Selva trans.. 1940).
123. See SIGMUND, supra note 114, at 55.
124. Id.
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The attack on the oil companies and other foreign holdings
changed during the nationalistic administration of President
Lazaro C.rdenas (1934-38).
President C~rdenas' policies, a

renaissance of the Revolution of 1910,125 were characterized by
the slogan "Mexico for the Mexicans."12 6 The most far-reaching
result of these nationalist policies was the expropriation of the
foreign-owned oil companies in 1938.127 Although politically the
nationalization was a great success, 12 8 economically the impact

was uncertain. Faced with the possibility that other Latin
American states would follow in Mexico's footsteps, the oil
companies instituted a boycott of Mexican oil, which touched off
an increased flight of foreign and domestic private capital. 129
The oil nationalization was also significant because It
generated the United States policies toward nationalization and
the formulation of its "prompt, adequate, and effective" standard
125. The phrase "a renaissance of the Revolution" Is used by WRIGHT, supra
note 69, at 66.
126. Id. Wright explains that President C~rdenas wanted to push forward two
important revolutionary alms--"redistribution of land and loosening the hold of
foreigners on the country's economy." Id. at 67. Cdrdenas was suspicious of
foreign "monopolies" and blamed Mexico's economic problems on foreign
investments. Id.
127. Id. at 68. The oil expropriation resulted in the elimination of "one of the
largest blocks of foreign capital in the country" and was hailed by Mexicans as the
beginning of their "economic independence." Id. See generally J. RICHARD POWELL,
THE MEXICAN PETROLEUM INDusTRY, 1938-1950 26 (1956). Ironically, the controversy with the foreign-owned oil companies that led to the expropriation was not
about the status of the companies' foreign holdings, but instead, revolved around
labor relations. The oil companies refused to comply with the oil union's
demands for increased wages; these demands were affirmed by the Mexican

Supreme Court. See WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 68-69.
128. See WRiGHT, supra note 69, at 68-69.
129. Id. at 70. The expropriation by the Cdrdenas administration of British
(Royal Dutch Shell) and United States (Standard Oil of New Jersey) oil interests,
began when workers, frustrated with the oil companies' refusal to grant them
higher wages and improve working conditions, decided to go on strike on May 18,
1937. President Cdrdena decided that the dispute should be settled by an
industrial arbitration board, which determined that the grievances of the workers
were legitimate and awarded them a one-third increase in their wages. The oil
companies appealed the decision to the Mexican Supreme Court, which upheld
the order. The oil companies challenged the sovereignty of the Mexican state by
refusing to obey the Supreme Court's decision. President Cdrdenas promptly
signed a decree nationalizing the assets of the companies. See RAMIREZ, supra
note 81, at 35.
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for just compensation. 13 0 Although the United States response to
the Mexican nationalization was divided, the irony was that this
division -was founded on United States dominance in Mexico's
mining, oil, and foreign commerce.'$" Economic sanctions or
military intervention would threaten United States interests in
Mexico. 1 3 2 The result was lengthy negotiations, which included a
letter by United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull to President

Cdrdenas insisting that Mexico pay "just compensation . . .
1
having a present effective value" to the oil companies. 3
The Mexican government, rejecting the traditional rule,
responded inter alia:1 34 (a) nationalization was a legitimate
exercise of its sovereign right to restructure its economy; (b) the
compensation demanded by the United States would constitute
an inadmissible fetter upon this right: "[Tihe future of the nation
could not be halted by the impossibility of immediately paying the
value of the property belonging to a small number of foreigners
who only seek a lucrative end;" and (c) United States investors
were not entitled to higher compensation than Mexican owners.
These two opposing views, which emanated from the diplomatic
exchanges between the two governments, would characterize their
respective positions for almost the entire century.
D. Economic Development Strategies and ForeignDirectInvestment

1.

Import Substituting Industrialization: 1930-1970s

Foreign direct investment contributed significantly to
Mexico's implementation of the model of economic development

130. See SIGMUND, supra note 114, at 60.

131. See LIPSON, supra note 15, at 79.
132. Id. Lipson states that the "hierarchy was reinforced by the confusion of
economic interests . . . [e]conomic relations with Mexico were extensive and
profitable--and they were not immediately endangered by the expropriations...

rigid sanctions would strike directly at the sizeable American investments
remaining in the country." Id.
133. In his letter, Hull stated: "This does not mean that the government may
My government directs
later pay, as and when it may suit its convenience ....
me to inquire ... what specific action with respect to payments for the properties
in question is contemplated by the Mexican government...." SIGMUND, supra
note 114, at 61. See also JOSEPHUS DANIELS, SHIRT-SLEEvE DIPLOMAT 230-34
(1947).
134. Asante, supra note 11, at 590.
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referred to as "import substituting industrialization" (ISI).13 5 The
ISI focuses on the development, production, and manufacture of
certain intermediate and capital goods to lessen imports and build

the local infrastructure to produce goods.1 3 6 After the Mexican
Revolution, foreign direct investment severely declined in Mexico,
During the 1930s, the
except in the petroleum sector. 137
nationalization of the petroleum industry further decreased
foreign direct investment. Although the elimination of petroleum

holdings was mainly responsible for this drop, the level of

investments in other attractive industries and in public utilities

135. See BELA BALASSA, THE PROCESS OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND
This author distinguishes two
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES (1980).
The first stage
stages in the import-substitution industrialization process.
replaces mportation of "nondurable consumer goods" with domestic production.
Id, at 8.
The second stage "involves the replacement of the mports of
intermediate goods and producer and consumer durables by domestic
production." Id. at 10. Balassa concludes that ISI policies work against export of
manufactured goods, discourage production, and encourage consumption by the
See also RENO
way of exchange rate and commercial policies. Id. at 16.
VILIARREAL, THE POLICY OF IMPORT SUBSTITUTING INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1925-1975 (for

an excellent account of ISI as an economic development model); see generally
CLARK W. REYNOLDS, THE MEXICAN ECONOMY (1970) (for an expanded analysis of
the Mexican economy); LEOPOLDO SOLfS, ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM IN MEXICO: A
CASE STUDY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1981) (for an excellent account of the
economic development strategies in Mexico); Edmund V.K. Fitzgerald, The
FinancialConstrainton Relative Autonomy: The State and CapitalAccumulation, In
Mexico 1940-1982, in 1 THE STATE AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN LATIN AMERICA
(Christian Anglade & Carlos Fortin eds.. 1985).
136. "Narrowly defined import-substitution is the development by the state of
policies designed to close a chronic (or structural) deficit between the export of
primary products and the import of manufactured goods." JAMES M. CYPHER,
DEVELOPMENT POLICY SINCE 1940 5 (1990).
STATE AND CAPITAL IN MEXICO:
Generally, "import-substitution is a strategy for development which favors the
expansion of the internal market, in contrast to orthodox neoclassical doctrines
which emphasize development through primary commodity exports (or through
following 'market forces')." Id. at 6.
137. From 1911 to 1929, United States investment in petroleum jumped,
from $20 million to $206 million, while the overall stock of United States foreign
direct investment in Mexico increased a small amount, from $616 to $683 million.
See WRIGHT, supra note 69. at 54, 77. The foreign-oil companies escaped major
property damage during the Mexican Revolution because of their location along
the coastal periphery of the state and by paying for protection. Their production
expanded substantially throughout the revolution. "By 1921, Mexico had become
the second largest oil producing country in the world," Its output of 193 million
barrels amounted to a quarter of the world's total. Id. at 62.
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also declined rapidly. 138 It was not until World War II that foreign
investors more actively participated in the Mexican economy, 13 9
as the demand for raw materials accelerated and the industrial
capacity of states diverted to wartime production. Mexico found
new markets for primary exports and diminished competition
from imports in its domestic markets. 14 °
While ISI began as an informal process, it became an explicit
governmental policy for achieving rapid industrial growth during
the administrations of Manuel Avila Camacho (1940-1946) and
Miguel Alemddn (1946-1952).
During this period, foreign
investment significantly contributed to the Mexican economy,
except in the manufacturing sector.' 4
In response to
international demand, nationalist policies allowed foreign firms to
move out of attractive industries and utilities and into
manufacturing. 1 42 In the post-World War H era, Mexican policy
makers became more sensitive to the need to protect local
industries from foreign domination.
President Manuel Avila
Camacho took advantage of his extraordinary wartime powers by
issuing the Emergency Decree of 1944,24 3 which introduced

138. By 1940, total foreign direct investment from the United States was

under $500 (United States) million, "slightly more than one-quarter of the
estimate for the mid-1920s." Id. at 70. Foreign control in the four areas
traditionally dominated by foreign capital-railroads, oil, mining, and electric
power had significantly decreased; in fact it was eliminated in railroads and oil.

Id.

139. The administration of President C~rdenas (1934-1940) set the stage for
the arrival of the transnational corporations, which in turn led to the growth of
foreign direct investment. See BERNARDO SEPULVEDA &
INVERSION EXTRANJERA EN Mexico 120 (1973).

ANTONIO CHUMACERO,

LA

140. "The virtual halt of imports of manufactured goods that had traditionally
been purchased abroad and the increased external demand for Mexican products
such as textiles, foodstuffs, fibers, tobacco, and chemicals created excellent
opportunities for investment in production facilities to supply Mexico's domestic
market and to take advantage of the export possibilities." WRiGIr, supra note 69,
at 71.
141. "Firms with majority foreign ownership, only 0.58 percent of all firms,
accounted for 10.2 percent of all industrial employment and 20.0 percent of both
production and investment." WHrrING, supra note 72, at 69. The author explains
that even these figures do not reflect the importance of foreign-owned enterprises
in the manufacturing sectors, since by 1972, "majority foreign-owned firms
accounted for 52 percent of the assets of the 300 largest manufacturing firms in
Mexico." Id.
142. Id.
143. Emergency Decree of 1944, D.O., July 7, 1944 [hereinafter Emergency
Decree].
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restraints on the "creation,
modification, liquidation and transfer
14 4
of Mexican stock."
The Emergency Decree exemplified a strong nationalist
response by the Mexican government to the growth of foreign
investment in the post-World War II era. The Decree granted
extensive discretionary control over foreign capital to the Ministry
of Foreign Relations,1 45 allowing it to mandate both Mexican
majority ownership in certain industries 148 and majority Mexican
control.1 47 The Decree was intended to avoid disrupting the
economy by the temporary investments of flight capital. Mexico's
booming economy during the World War II attracted an influx of
foreign capital, and the Mexican government feared that existing
Mexican investments would be displaced by foreign investors.
Although the extraordinary powers of the president were lifted in
1945, revocation of the Emergency Decree was accompanied by
executive orders relating to state intervention in the Mexican
economy that would be retained under the law.
Between 1940 and 1965, foreign direct investment almost
quadrupled. By the late 1950s, the nationalist position toward
foreign direct investment reflected by the Emergency Decree gave
way to a different attitude towards foreign capital. 14 8 The shift
resulted in massive increases of foreign direct investment 14 9 in
various industries, providing the momentum for the investment

144. ALEXANDER C. HOAGLAND, JR., COMPANY FORMATION INMEXICO B-2 (1988).

See also Sandra F. Mavlglia, Mexico's Guidelines for Foreign Investment: The
Selective Promotionof Necessary Industries,80 AM. INT'L L. 281, 285 (1986).
145. HOAGLAND, supra note 144, at B-2; see also WRIGHT, supra note 69, at
101-03.
146. See Michael W. Gordon. The Joint Venture as an Institutionfor Mexican
Development. A Legislative History, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L. J. at 173, 183.
147. See Maviglia, supra note 144, at 285; see also ROGER D. HANSEN, LA
POLTICA DEL DEsARROLLO ECONOMIcO 67 (1973).

148. By the late 1950s, foreign capital had become an increasingly important
factor in the national economy.
Entrepreneurs began to feel threatened
economically by the foreign firms active in Mexico and they sought the protection
of the state. See ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLITICAL CONFLICT: U.S.-LATN AMERICAN
RELATIONS 20-21 (Jorge I. Dominguez ed., 1982) (hereinafter Dominguez); see
generally RAYMOND VERNON, THE DILEMMA OF MEmco's DEVELOPMENT 38 (1963).

149. By 1955, foreign investment in Mexico, both direct and indirect, had
almost doubled n a decade, from $584 million In 1945 to $919 million in 1955.
H. MAY & J. FERNANDEZ, IMPACT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS INMEXICo 63 (1971).

19941

NAFTA AND INVESTMENT IN MECO

pendulum to swing back during the 1960s under the policy of
15
"Mexicanization." 2
2.

Mexicanization: 1960s

The Mexican government's shift in attitude toward foreign
direct investment in the late 1950s, and the subsequent massive
increases in foreign capital during this period, led to demands
from Mexican industrialists to limit the inflow of foreign
capital. 1 5 ' Not surprisingly, with the political legacy of foreign
investment and Mexico's past vigilance of its economic and
political independence, the government pursued and strictly
implemented national policies defining and controlling the
15 2
activities of foreign capital and individuals.
The policy of Mexicanization
adopted during the
administration of Avila Camacho, which required at least fifty-one
percent of all private business and industry in particular, to be
owned by Mexican nationals to ensure local control of the

economy and local participation in its benefits, was accelerated
during the 1960s. During this time President L6pez Mateos
(1958-1964) developed economic nationalist policies and
expanded the state's role in the Mexican economy in response to a

sudden upsurge of foreign investment to more than ten percent of
the total.

Between 1960 and 1963, exercising the authority

granted under the Emergency Decree of 1944, the Ministry of
Foreign Relations extended the list of industries in which majority
Mexican equity was required to the automotive supply, chemicals
(including fertilizers and insecticides), and office equipment
industries.
The Ministry excluded by legislation foreign
150. The Mexican industrialists were organized, with the Camera Nacional de
la Industria de Transformaci6n (CANACINTRA or CNIT) as the principal outlet for
their views. See WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 78.
151. Id.
152. The administration of Lopez Mateos (1958-1964) was so persistent in
pursuing its nationalist policies during this period, that the state experienced
significant outflow of capital from domestic and foreign sources in 1960 and
1961. See MerIlee S. Grindle, PublicPolicy, ForeignInvestment and Implementation
Style In Mexico, In Dominguez, supra note 148, at 69, 80.
Although President Manuel Avila Camacho (1940-1946) had adopted the
policy of requiring Mexican majority ownership (51%) in certain key industries in
the 1940s, this policy was not fully enforced until the 1960s. Douglas Bennett et
al., Mexico and MultinationalCorporations:An Explanation of State Action, In LATIN
AMERiCA AND THE WORLD ECONOMY: A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER 277 (1978).
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participation in Mexico's banking, insurance, and other financial
institutions.1 53 The Mexican government also employed other
techniques
to
displace
foreign
investment,
including
discriminatory taxation, awarding government contracts on a
discriminatory basis, and the selective use of permits and
licenses.) 5 4
The antiforeign investment efforts by the
administration of L6pez Mateos had a significant Impact on the
outflow of capital from domestic and foreign sources in 1960 and
1961.15r This forced the Mexican administration to take a more
conciliatory position toward foreign direct investment, causing the
pendulum to swing away from nationalist policies.
3. The Emergence of Contradicting Policies and Transnational
Corporations: 1970-1982

By 1970, Mexico had "demonstrated consistent patterns of
state intervention in the economy," especially with regard to
foreign direct investment, but inconsistencies in the application of
that intervention continued. 156
The policy of encouraging
Mexicanization through selective enforcement of
various
instruments affecting majority foreign-owned enterprises (such as
discriminatory taxation), continued during the administration of
Gustavo Dfaz Ordaz (1964-1970).157 Simultaneously, however,
this administration courted both domestic and foreign capital to
invest in Mexico's private sector, which resulted in a significant
increase in foreign investment, especially from the United
States. 1 a
While
Mexican
business
supported
the
153. See Dominguez, supra note 148, at 86.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See WHITING, supra note 72, at 80. According to Whiting, Mexico's

patterns of state intervention in the economy was not only as a regulator, but also
as an owner (through expropriation) and as a promoter of foreign investment. Id.
157. See Grindle, supra note 152, at 80. President Dfaz Ordaz also continued
the policies of his predecessors in advocating national control of natural
resources and utilities and preserving national control of banking and insurance.
See WHITING, supra note 72, at 78.
158. The increase Is mostly attributed to two important policies of the Diaz
Ordaz administration:
[the elimination ofl It]he extensions of the Mexicanization list of the
Ministry of Foreign Relations to include fertilizers, insecticides, basic
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administration's open attitude toward private capital in general, it
demanded more restrictive policies toward foreign investment.15 9
The widespread proliferation during the late 1960s and 1970s
of foreign-owned TNCs in Mexico, coupled with the negative
sentiments toward TNCs by developing states in the international
arena,16 ° had a significant impact on Mexico's nationalist position

toward foreign direct Investment in the 1970s.

The Mexican

government, like other third world governments, became highly
sensitive and critical toward the harmful effects of TNCs. 16 ' Once
seen as sources of technology, employment, training, and
entrepreneurial skill, by the 1970s TNCs were perceived as foreign
intruders that sought personal profits without considering the
social and economic needs of the host state. 162 By the time
President Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) took office, the Mexican
government was making a more concerted effort to regulate the
activities of foreign direct investors and firms. This effort was in
response to domestic and international criticisms about the role
chemicals, and food products, adopted under [President] Lopez Mateos...
(and the rescission] of the requirement that Mexican companies investing
in restricted industries must have a clause excluding foreigners-a
requirement aimed at eliminating foreign investment in restricted
industries through holding companies.
WfITING, supra note 72, at 76. By 1970, nearly three-quarters of all foreign
investment was in manufacturing. Id.
159. See Grindle, supra note 152, at 80.
160. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
161. When the TNCs first established subsidiaries in Mexico, the Mexican
government expected that the increased flow of foreign direct investment could
assist Mexico in developing its economy by injecting external capital into the
economy, assisting in the generation of tax revenue and foreign exchange,
acquiring and adopting technology and managerial skills to domestic needs, and
employing and training nationals.
162. By this time, the dependlstas were arguing that although some
development was possible under the international domination of capitalism, it
was "dependent development," and this would produce underdevelopment. The
dependtstas put foreign investment at the center of their analysis, holding that it

was the major force of the international domination of capitalism. See FERNANDO
H. CARDoso & ENzo FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
(1969); see generally CELSO FURTADO, DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT
(1964); Fernando H. Cardoso, Dependency and Development in Latin America, NEW
LEFT REvIEw 83 (July-Aug. 1972); Theotonio D. Santos, The Structure of
Dependence, AM. ECON. R. PAPERS & PROC. 231 (1970). For an excellent account
of the role of TNCs in the dependency theory, see Raymond Vernon, Multinational
Enterprises in Developing Countries:Issues, In DEPENDENCY AND INTERDEPENDENCE IN
THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF DEVELOPMENT-PoLTCAL
CONSIDERATIONS (1975).
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of foreign direct Investment in general and TNC operations in
particular in the economic development of developing host
states.163
Although the Echeverria administration remained committed
to industrial growth, ISI policies alone were insufficient to attain

this goal. 16 '

The administration therefore began to promote

development of export-oriented products and capital goods.1 6 5 To
increase its exports, Mexico needed foreign assistance to improve
technology, invest in new industries, and manufacture goods for
export, while assuring that these foreign interests conformed to
Mexican national objectives. Accordingly, the Mexican Congress
passed the Law for the Promotion of Mexican Investment and for
the Regulation of Foreign Investment (1973 FIL). 16 Its purpose
was "to promote Mexican investment and regulate foreign
investment in order to stimulate a just and balanced development
67
and consolidate the country's economic independence."
The 1973 FIL did little to discourage foreign direct investment
in Mexico during the 1970s. The Mexican government and its
agencies still enjoyed too much discretion to expand or limit the
possible areas of investment. 168 President Jose Lopez Portillo
(1976-1982), pressured by the Mexican business community to
encourage domestic and foreign investment in Mexico, responded
by applying the 1973 FIL16 9 in a very flexible manner, the result
of which was to increase foreign direct investment. 7 0

163. During this time, national business organizations became very active in
their criticism of foreign direct investment. Grindle, supra note 152, at 81.

164. Id.
165. See PETER MoRICi, TRADE TALKS wrrH MEXICO:

A TIME FOR REALISM 19

(1991).

166. Ley ParaPromover la Inversion Mextcana y Regular la Inversion Extranjera
[Law to Promote the Mexican Investment and Regulate the Foreign Investment],
D.O., March 9, 1973 [hereinafter 1973 Fl. See discussion infra part W.E.1.
167. See 1973 FIL, supra note 166.
168. See WILSON PEREs NUNEZ, FOREIGN DiRECT INVESTMENT AND INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT IN MEXIco 15 (1990).
169. See 1973 FL, supra note 166. See discussion Infra part IV.E.1.
170. Whiting maintains that:
The first and most striking result of the [FILl regulation of foreign

investment in Mexico is that contrary to dire predictions, the flow of
foreign investment capital into Mexico was not deterred ... [elvery year
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By 1976, Mexico's financial straits mandated more than

domestic policy changes.

Plagued by massive capital flight,

inflation, unproductive experimental development programs, and
external account imbalances, the Bank of Mexico had to devalue
the Mexican peso,17 1 forcing the Echeverria administration to
seek the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 1 72 The

Mexico IMF Agreement obligated Mexico to change a number of its
economic policies as a condition to lending. 173

Although the

Agreement had a duration of three years, Mexico ended the
Agreement prematurely during the massive oil discoveries of the
late 1970s, the so-called "oil boom."1 7 4
During the oil boom, which was concentrated between 1978
and 1981, Mexico's traditionally restrictive policy toward foreign
investment reemerged, nationalistic priorities were emphasized,
The
and significant investment barriers were enforced. 1 75
Mexico launched an
nationalist period did not last long.
ambitious development process based on future oil projections
and borrowed heavily from international financial firms to finance
its domestic agenda. 178 By 1981, however, oil prices began to
drop sharply 77 and the Mexican economy suffered a dramatic
decline, leading to the economic crisis of 1982.

since the law was passed in 1973, the stock of foreign investment has
increased at a faster pace than the increases of 1971 and 1972.
WHrING, supra note 72. at 101-02.
171. For an analysis of the sources and policy options at the time, see Gerard
Bueno, El Desarrolode la Economla Mexicana, In OPnIONS DE POLITICA EN MEaCO
DESPUES DE LA DEVALUACION (1977). See generally CYPHER, supra note 135, at 5.
172. The IMF is the principal multilateral organization which plays an
increasingly important role in the restructuring of the debt. See M. MENDELSOHN,
COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF CROSS-BORDER DEBT 12-13 (1983);
see also Elizabeth S. Stukey. Note, Economic Interdependence and the Sovereignty
of DebtorNations:A Comparisonof Mexican andArgentine Reactions to International
Monetary Fund Stabilization,8 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 544, 563 (1985).
173. See supra note 135, at 5.
174. Id. at 6.
175. Id.
176. See BANCO DE MEXICO, INFORME ANUAL 36 (1982). See also, EL SiSTEMA

EcoNoMIco MEXICANO (Rogello Montemayor ed., 1982) (describing the growth of
Mexico's external revenues from the mid-1970s to 1982, which was due to the
discovery and exploitation of huge oil reserves).
177. See Reno Villarreal, De la Industrialization Substitutiva a la Peto,
Dependencla Externa y Desustituclon de Importanclones, in EL SISTEMA ECONOMICO
M[ECANO (Rogelio Montemayor ed., 1982).
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The 1982 Crisis and Modem Mexican Foreign Investment

Policy

On August 20, 1982,178 Mexico announced that it could no
longer service its debt.1 7 9 This debt crisis1 80 severely constrained
Mexico's ability to pursue the economic nationalist policies of the
past. Accordingly, this crisis has been one of the most significant
factors in the turnaround of Mexican economic policy. The

turnaround,

often

referred

to

as

the

new

"Southern

Liberalism,"181 was precipitated by a series of economic problems.
Following a period of impressive growth from the oil discoveries In
the 1970s, the Mexican economy suffered a series of drastic
reversals precipitated by a sudden fall in the world petroleum
price.1 8 2 At the same time, the demand for goods generated by
the oil exports had spurred imports, causing imports to increase
more rapidly than exports,3S8 which resulted in balance of
payments difficulties. 184 Additionally, international banks and

178. See Castro Tapia, Mexlco's Debt Restructuring:The Evolving Solution, 23
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 4 (1984); Mexico Seeks to Stop Paying Debt Principal,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1982. at 2; Allen Meltzer, A Way to Defuse the World Debt
Bomb, FORTUNE, Nov. 28, 1983, at 137.
179. Mexico's outstanding foreign debt exceeded $80 billion, 30% of which
was due within the year. Steven M. Cohen, Give Me Equity or Give Me DebtAvoiding a Latin American Debt Revolution, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 89, 94 nn.3738 (1988) (citing Bogdanowicz-Bindert, World Debt. The United States Reconsiders,
64 FOREIGN AFF. 259, 262 (1986)).
The Mexican government notified the
International Monetary Fund, the United States Secretary of the Treasury, and
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board that it could not meet its debt
obligations. Id. at 94.
180. The Mexican debt crisis triggered the "world debt crisis." Although
commentators have traced the emergence of a full blown debt crisis to a variety of
events, most believe that it was Mexico's debt problems that brought the
monetary and fiscal crisis to head. See ld. at 94 n.36 (citing DARRELL DELAMAIDE,
DEBT SHOCK: THE FULL STORY OF THE WORLD CREDIT CRIsis 6-8 (1985)); see also
Pedro-Pablo Kuczynsk:, The Outlookfor LatinAmerican Debt, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 129
(1987) (reviewing the Latin American debt crisis).
181. See WHITING, supra note 72, at 238. Whiting comments: "Mexico has
become a leader in advocating and implementing southern liberalism. This has
meant accepting a mixed economy and an active state industrial policy while still
fostering an expansion of international trade with relatively free markets." Id.

182. BANCO DE MEXICO, INFORME ANUAL 33, 36 (1982).
183. Id. at 29, 31.
184. Id. at 32,34.
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financial institutions generated a plunge in the supply of money
and credit in 1981,185 and public expenditures on domestic
subsidies and numerous state-owned enterprises went
unchecked. As a result, Mexico was forced to suspend all debt
payments for three months to obtain a rescheduling
agreement. 185
The rapid deterioration and ultimate collapse of the Mexican
economy in mid-1982, combined with the world recession, left

Mexico with few economic policy choices.

In 1982, President

Lopez Portillo attempted to revitalize the economy by nationalizing
the banks. 18 7 When President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1986)
took office in December 1982, he set in motion new economic
policies oriented toward liberalizing the Mexican trade regime,
creating a more favorable climate for foreign direct investment.
Accordingly, after years of obdurate Mexican resistance, President
de la Madrid announced in 1986 Mexico's entry to GATT. 18 8
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari has undertaken a
restructuring of the foreign investment policies in Mexico as part
of an overall economic reform.
Moreover, foreign direct
investment is an integral part of President Salinas' National
Development Plan (1989-1994) for revitalizing the Mexican
economy 189
E. The Legal Framework of ForeignDirectInvestment In Mexico
1. The Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate
Investment
The 1973 FIL19 ° codified applicable constitutional principles
and established a rigid system of regulation over foreign
185. The international banks and financial institutions, which had been eager
to take advantage of Mexico's economic growth during the 1970s, invested heavily
with loans during 1977 and 1978. Id. at 32. See generally, ROBERT E. LOONEY,
ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING INMEXICO 117-222 (1985).
186. See Cohen, supra note 179, at 95.
187. Decree Nationalizingthe Banks of Mexico, D.O., Sept. 2, 1982.
188. See UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, REVIEW OF TRADE
AND INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION MEASURES BY MEXICO AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE
UNrTED STATES-M=EXICAN RELATIONS 1-2 n. 16 (1990) (Pub. 2275).
189. These objectives are stated in President Salinas' National Developments
Plan (1989-1994). PlanNaclonal de Desarrollo 1989-1994, D.O., May 31, 1989.

190. See 1973 FIL, supra note 166.
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investment.
Mexican policymakers in the early 1970s were
concerned about foreign investment and TNC operations on
Mexico's economy and had been enlightened by similar concerns
in other Latin American nations and the Third World. These
policymakers therefore emphasized the need to reaffirm Mexico's
sovereignty and economic independence in the 1973 FIL. 19 1
Accordingly, the FIL set forth the following main objectives: (1)
foreign investment should complement Mexican investment; (2)

foreign investment should associate with domestic capital, but
only on a minority basis; and (3) concentration of foreign
ownership by sector or region should be avoided. 19 2 The purpose
of the law was "to promote Mexican investment and regulate
foreign investment in order to stimulate a just and balanced
development
and
consolidate
the
country's
economic
independence." 19 3 The themes of economic sovereignty and state
autonomy over the control of foreign investment in the 1973 FIL'
echoed the themes of the Charter of Economic Rights that would
be adopted by the United Nations one year later; hardly4
10
surprising, since it was Mexico that had proposed the Charter.
The FIL established the national boundaries for the regulation of
foreign direct investment, while the Charter established the
international boundaries.
The framework for the "balanced development" objective
prescribed in the FIL is embodied in a regulatory scheme that
requires majority Mexican participation in a broad spectrum of
economic sectors and activities, while limiting foreign
participation to specific designated areas.19 5 Accordingly, the
1973 FIL classifies economic activities exclusively reserved for the
Mexican government,1 9 6 those reserved to Mexican individuals or
191. See LOONEY, supranote 185, at 57.
192. 1973 FIL, supra note 166, art. 1.

See generally CHANGING

LEGAL

ENVIRONMENT IN LATIN AMERICA. MANAGEMENT IMPLIcATIONS 276-99 (Stuart Holland

& Esteban A. Ferrer eds., 1974); Adolfo A. Vizcaino, The Law on Foreign
Investments, 7 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 33 (1977).

193. 1973 FIL, supra note 166, art. 1.
194. See JoNES, supra note 23, at 57.
195. This was the first time legislation required

majority

Mexican

participation in a range of activities and not Just a single activity. See Maviglla,
supra note 144. at 290.
196. 1973 FIL. supra note 166, art 4. Article 4 provides that the following
activities are reserved exclusively to the state: oil and gas, basic petrochemicals,
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corporations without foreign participation, and those in which
foreign participation 9 7 is specifically limited to less than fortynine percent. 19 8 The FIL also contains a general provision
limiting foreign participation in new businesses whose activities
are otherwise not regulated to a maximum of forty-nine
Moreover, the FIL requires governmental
percent. 19
authorization for investments that acquire more than twenty-five
percent of the equity or more than forty-nine percent of the fixed
assets of an existing Mexican company, 20° and for any
transaction1 resulting in the transfer of management to a foreign
20
investor.
The FIL vests the highest authority to regulate foreign
investment in Mexico with the National Foreign Investment

exploitation of radioactive minerals and production of nuclear energy, mining in
the particular cases referred to by the applicable laws, electric power, railroads,
telegraphic and radiotelegraphic communications, and other activities and
industries set forth by specific statutes. Id.
197. Id. This Article provides that activities reserved to Mexican individuals
or corporations without foreign participation, include radio and television, urban
and inter-urban transportation and transportation on federal highways, air and
maritime transportation, forestry, distribution of gas, and other activities set forth
by specific statutes or regulations enacted by the federal Executive.
198. Id. art. 5. Foreign investment will be allowed in the following activities or
companies in the proportions specified:
a)
Exploitation of minerals. Concessions for exploitation thereof may
not be granted or transferred to foreign individuals or corporations. In
companies engaged in those activities, foreign investment may participate
up to a maximum of 49% in the event of exploitation of minerals subject
to ordinary concession, and up to a maximum of 34% in the event of
special concessions for the exploitation of natural minerals reserves;
b) By-products of petrochemicals: 40%.
c) Manufacturing of automobile components: 40%; and,
d) Those activities set forth by specific statutes or by regulations
published by the Federal Executive.
Id. art. 5.
199. Article 5 further provides:
In the event where the applicable legal provisions, or regulations, do not
require a definite percentage, foreign investment may only participate in a
proportion not to exceed 49% of the capital stock of a company, provided
however, that the foreign investors do not have, under any title, the power
to determine the administration of the company.
Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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Commission (FIC).20 2 Under its broad discretionary powers, the

FIC has the option to increase the maximum forty-nine percent
foreign investment limitation whenever
it deems the project
20 3

beneficial to the Mexican economy.
The FIC, which consists of representatives of the Mexican
president and seven ministries, 2 0 4 served as the screening

mechanism for majority foreign equity investment in Mexico until
the late 1980s. 20 5 Pursuant to its statutory powers, the FIC can:

(1) increase or reduce the percentage of foreign participation in
geographical areas or economic activities when definite
percentages are required and establish the terms and conditions

under which the investment will be received; 2 06 (2) set forth
specific percentages and conditions for those projects which "may

justify special treatment;" 20 7 and (3) establish "requirements and
criteria" for the application of foreign Investment laws and

regulations. 208

The 1973 FIL provides exceptions to the forty-nine percent

requirement

in

few

instances

and

only

under

special

circumstances. 2 ° 9 The FIC bases its decision to grant exceptions
on the criteria set forth in the National Industrial Development

Plan (NIDP) and the FIL.2 1 0

Each NIDP has provided specific

indicators of the attitude and direction to be taken by the
incumbent administration toward foreign investment. The few

exceptions made by the FIC were in sectors such as tourism,
priority

industries,

advanced

technology,

capitalization

and

202. Id. arts. 4, 5. 8, 12. Under the 1973 FIL, all newly created business
concerns, both domestic and foreign, must register with the National Registry of
Foreign Investment (FIR). Additionally, all foreign concerns existing when the FIL
was enacted were required to register. Id.
203. Id. arts. 1, 5. The burden is on the foreign investor to show that majority
foreign equity and control would "stimulate a balanced and equitable
development" and "consolidate the economic independence of the country." Id.
art. 1.
204. Id. arts. 1, 5.
205. Id.
206. See d. arts. 5, 12(l).
207. Id. art. 12(1).
208. Id.
209. Exceptions to the forty-nine percent limitation on foreign ownership were
rarely granted. See Jorge Camil, Mexico's 1989 Foreign Investment Regulations:
The Cornerstoneof a New Economic Model, 12 Hous. J. INV'L L. 1. 2 n.5 (1989).
210. 1973 FIL, supra note 166, art. 13.
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investments preserving employment, and for priority activities of
Mexican corporations with severe economic problems.

2.

The 1989 Regulations

In 1989, pursuant to the constitutional authority under
Article 89 of the Mexican Constitution, 2 11 President Salinas
issued the new foreign investment regulations (1989
Regulations), 2 12 amending the 1973 FIL. The 1989 Regulations
repealed all existing regulations, resolutions, and decrees, but did
not modify the 1973 FIL itself.2 13 The stated purpose of the
Regulations is to increase the volume of investment capital and to
accelerate the flow of investment capital by deregulating foreign
211. See MEx. CONST., supra note 77, art. 89(I). Article 89 of the Mexican
Constitution grants the President the power to "promulgate and execute the laws
enacted by the Congress of the Union, providing for their exact enforcement in the
administrative sphere." Id. This provision has been interpreted as the "power to
enact general rules in the form of regulations (reglamentos). Regulations have the
purpose of explaining and supplying detailed rules for the application of specific
laws, and most statutes are supplemented in this manner." WRIGHT, supra note
69, at 16.
Although the President has constitutional authority to issue
regulations, there has been considerable debate about the constitutionality of the
1989 Regulations. "One Mexican lawyer has opined that the New Regulations are
constitutional, because they (a) do not contravene the Mexican Constitution, (b)
were issued by the President under constitutional regulatory powers, and (c) were
duly signed by all corresponding members of the presidential cabinet. This
lawyer concludes that the final determination on the constitutionality issue
corresponds to the Mexican Supreme Court." Legal Opinion addressed by Dr.
Luis Miguel Diaz to Lic. Miguel Jauregui, Chairman of the Mexican Legislation
Committee, American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico, July 13, 1989 (on fie
with Mexican Legislation Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce of
Mexico City). "Another Mexican lawyer strongly believes that the New Regulations
are unconstitutional because both the FIL and the Mexican Constitution have the
purpose of regulating and not promoting foreign investment. This argument
seems to imply that the president is unable to issue decrees promoting foreign
investment." Camil, supra note 209, at 13 n. 111. See also JORGE G. PALAcIo, LEY
DE INVERSION EXTRANJERA Y su REGLAMENTO CoMlENTADOS, 139-40 (1989).
212. Reglamento de la Ley para Promover la Inversion Mexlcana y Regular la
InversionExtranjera,D.O., May 16, 1989 [hereinafter 1989 Regulations].
213. In 1989, when the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari decided to
change the foreign investment policy in Mexico, it was decided that amending the
1973 FIL would have many political implications for a new administration.
Because President Salinas did not garner the substantial influence in Congress to
amend the 1973 FIL, the administration elected to use the President's
constitutional authority. See Camil, supra note 209, at 13. See also Ignacio
Gomez-Palaclo, The New Regulation on Foreign Investment In Mexico: A Difficult
Task, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 253, 262 (1990).
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Investment procedures. Consequently, the 1989 Regulations do
not actively promote foreign investment, for there are no
provisions granting incentives such as tax breaks or cost
reductions in land.21 4 Rather, the intent of the Regulations is to
promote foreign investment by simplifying and clarifying the
21 5
investment mechanisms.
The 1989 Regulations accord foreign investors a broad range
of investment opportunities by eliminating the need for prior
authorization from the National Foreign Investment Commission,
if certain conditions are met. 2 16 The most significant provision of
the 1989 Regulations, Article 5, grants foreign investors the right
to acquire up to 100 percent of the shares in an existing
enterprise without prior authorization, as long as the investor
complies with set conditions and requirements and the activity is

not listed in the Included classification.2 17

The 100 percent

214. See Gomez-Palacio, supra note 213, at 259.
215. 1989 Regulations,supra note 212, pmbl. at 11-12.
216. Id. art. 5.
217. The activities listed in the "classification," i.e., the "classified" activities,
are categorized and marked accordingly as follows: (1) activities exclusively
carried out by the state; (2) activities exclusively for Mexican citizens; (3) activities
limited to thirty-four, forty, and forty-nine percent 'foreign ownership; and (4)
activities that have no percentage limit on foreign investor control (unclassified
activities). 1989 Regulations, supra note 201, art. 5. The 100 percent clause in
Article 5 refers to the unclassified activities. The conditions set forth in Article 5
of the 1989 Regulations are as follows:
For purposes of the provisions of section (d) of article five of the Law,
foreign investors may participate in any proportion in the capital stock of a
corporation, in the act of its incorporation for the performance of activities
not included in the Classification, and will not require therefore the
authorization of the Ministry, provided that:
I.
They invest an amount in fixed assets destined for economic
activities, appropriate for the corporation in its pre-operational
period, not to exceed that established from time to time by the
Ministry, for updating purposes.
11.
The investments referred to in the preceding fraction are made with
financial resources proceeding from abroad, obtained as capital
contributions by partners or shareholders, or through financing
granted by foreign entities or by credit institutions with resources
obtained aboard. If the partners or shareholders of the company
being incorporated are foreign investors already established in this
country, that they may make said investments with resources
proceeding from their own patrimony. That the minimum amount of
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provisions of Article 5 contradict the 1973 FIL.2 18
contradictions have caused legal insecurity among
2 19
investors in Mexico.
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These
foreign

The 1989 Regulations constitute a major shift in foreign

investment policy in Mexico.

The nationalist policies toward

foreign direct investment of the 1973 FIL have been replaced by
the more open foreign Investment regime of the 1989 Regulations.
IV. THE NAFTA INVESTMENT CHAPTER AND MEXICO: NEW RULES
GOvERNING FOREIGN DmEcT INVESTMENT

Chapter 11 of NAFTA establishes an open investment regime
that expands the protection of foreign investors and property
beyond any treaty to which a NAFTA signatory is a party. The
NAFTA investment obligations, particularly with respect to
treatment, protection against dispossession, and compensation
for expropriation of alien property, represent a significant shift in
Mexico's position regarding traditional rules governing foreign

IH.

IV.

V.

VI.

paid-in capital stock be equivalent to 20% of the total investment of
fixed assets at the end of the pre-operational period.
That the company so incorporated locates the industrial
establishments they require for performance of their industrial or
manufacturing activities, outside the geographical zones of greatest
industrial concentration and subject to controlled growth, as said
zones are defined by the corresponding administrative provisions.
That the company so incorporated maintains, as minimum results
during the first three years of its operations, a position of equilibrium
in its balance of foreign currency. A company will be deemed to have
initiated its operations on the date of its obtainment of the first
revenue from the commercial sale of its products or from the
rendering of its services.
That the company so incorporated will generate permanent jobs and
establish sustained programs of training, capacitation and personal
development for their workmen, in accordance with the applicable
legislation.
That the company so incorporated is to make use of adequate
technology and to observe all legal provisions in matters of ecology.
A foreign investor.will be deemed to have agreed with the requisites
established in this article, by the sole fact of his acquisition of a
share in a company incorporated in accordance with the regime
established by this Article.

Id.
218. Id.
219. See Camil, supra note 209, at 5.
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investment. Since the nineteenth century, Mexico has contested
vehemently the traditional principles of international law
governing the protection of foreigners and foreign property. 2 20 As
previously discussed, the Mexican Constitution 22 1 embodies the
Calvo Doctrine, 2 22 a direct challenge to the international

minimum standard doctrine advocated by industrialized states in
Furthermore, in the
international economic relations. 22 3
international arena, Mexico has led the Third World In a call for
restructuring international law to support the sovereignty of every
treatment of foreign investment located in its
state in the
2 24
territories.
A. Scope and Coverage: General Overview
The principles regarding scope and coverage application are
found in the NAFTA provisions defining "investors" of the
signatories. 2 25 Under the treaty, an investor of a NAFTA party is
defined to include "a NAFTA party or state enterprise thereof, or a
national or an enterprise of such [p]arty, that seeks to make, is
making or has made an investment."2 25 An enterprise of a NAFTA
party includes all forms of business entities "constituted or
organized" under the laws of that NAFTA party.2 27 The provisions
of the Investment Chapter cover not only investors from a NAFTA
party, but also investors with substantial business activities in
NAFTA states. 2 28 Investment is defined to include ownership and
all interests in an enterprise, such as certain loans to an9
enterprise and equity and debt security of an enterprise.2

220. See discussion supra part Il.A.
221. See supranote 77.

222. See discussion regarding the Calvo Doctrine, supra note 19 and
accompanying text.
223. Id.
224. Mexico proposed the Charter of Economic Rights for adoption by the

United Nations. See JoNES, supra note 23, at 57.
225. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1139.
226. Id.
227. Id. art. 1139.
228. Id.
229. Id. NAFTA provides that "investment does not mean the following:
(a) claims to money that arise solely from:
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Investment covers interests that entitle an owner to share in
income or profits of the enterprise, assets of the enterprise on
dissolution, real estate, and tangible or intangible property,2 30
including intellectual property.
The Investment Chapter covers all areas of investment not
Furthermore, provisions in
addressed in its other chapter.2'
NAFTA states, but also
from
only
cover
investors
Chapter 11 not
in NAFTA states.
business
activities
investors with substantial
B.

1.

General Treatment Standards

National and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment

The Investment Chapter provides that each NAFTA party
must treat NAFTA investors and their investments no less
This
favorably than its own investors and investments.2 2
principle, called a national treatment obligation, ensures the
equality of treatment between foreigners and nationals.2
Furthermore, NAFTA provides that each NAFTA party treat NAFTA
investors and their investments no less favorably than it treats
investors or investments from third parties. 2a 4 This principle,
known as Most Favored Nation, guarantees that treaty-protected
investments will be treated at least as favorably by the NAFTA
state as nationals and firms from any third state. To illustrate, if
Mexico extends a particular benefit to investments from a state

like Brazil, it must offer the same benefit to investors from the
I)

commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services by a

national or enterprise in the territory of a Party to an enterprise
in the territory of another Party, or
ii)

the extension of credit in connection with a commercial
transaction, such as trade financing, other than a loan ...

[or]
(b) any other claims to money...

Id.
230. Id.

231. Id. art. 1101.
232. Id. art. 1102.
233. Once in effect, NAFTA will accord Mexico the right to continue to screen
foreign acquisitions above an initial threshold of $25 million. The threshold figure
will be progressively increased to $150 million (in addition to inflation
adjustments) over ten years. The impact of screening is likely to have minimal
effect because the Mexican companies are small.
234. Id. art. 1103.
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United States and Canada. These treatment principles apply to
all measures relating to the "establishment, acquisition,
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other
disposition of investments."2s5 Subject to the agreed exceptions
in the annexes, 2s 6 these obligations ensure that a NAFTA party
may not subject enterprises to different or more onerous
operating conditions simply by virtue of foreign ownership.
NAFTA provides that a NAFTA party must accord the better of
either national or Most Favored Nation treatment.237 This allows
the foreign investor to take advantage of whichever standard of
treatment is more beneficial, ensuring that the foreign investor
will suffer no disadvantage in relation to either host state
nationals or to investors from third states. NAFTA expressly
prohibits certain commonly encountered impediments to
investment, such as requiring that a minimum level of equity be
held by nationals or that certain senior management positions be
reserved to local nationals.
For Mexico, the national treatment standard is clearly a
departure from the requirement of minority ownership and
control of the 1973 FIL. 8 As noted previously, the 1973 FIL
codified the policy of Mexicanization, mandating that at least fiftyone percent of all private enterprises in Mexico, particularly
industry, be owned by Mexican nationals to ensure local control
of the economy and local participation in its benefits. 2s 9

The

Mexicanization policy governing foreign investment was pursued
even before its codification in the 1973 FIL, and was replaced
when the 1989 Regulations"O were issued. Since the 1973 FIL
remains intact, however, the liberalized foreign investment
scheme of the 1989 Regulations can only be assured by the
passage of NAFTA. Since the 1989 Regulations did not change
235. Id. arts. 1102, 1103.
236. Id. annex I-M. In annex I-M, all the NAFTA parties list existing measures
of the NAFTA state that derogate from national and Most-Favored-Nation
treatment, or performance requirements obligations. The measures in this
section may not be made more restrictive and, if liberalized, may not later be
made more restrictive. Id.
237. NAFTA, supranote 1, art. 1104.
238. See 1973 FIL, supra note 166.
239. See kL
240. See 1989 Regulations,supranote 212.
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the 1973 Law, NAFTA will assure that the liberalization of foreign

investment in the 1989 Regulations remain intact.241
2.

Minimum Standard of Treatment

NAFTA requires that the host state accord to investments of a
NAFTA party "treatment in accordance with international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security."24 2 The reference to international law in NAFTA signifies
a recognition by the parties that customary principles of
international law exist external to the treaty. "Fair and equitable"
treatment is a classic formulation of international law. While the
precise meaning of the phrase is open to a variety of
interpretations, an important aspect 'of this standard is that
foreign investors should not lack the protection and security
Another important implication of the
afforded to nationals.
standard is that foreign investors should not, in comparison with
nationals, be put at a competitive disadvantage in obtaining
permits or authorizations necessary to conduct business
operations in the state concerned.
C. Prohibitionof PerformanceRequirements
of
performance
imposition
the
prohibits
NAFTA
"in
connection with the establishment,
requirementsm

241. Id.
242. NAFTA, supra note 1. art. 1105 (1).
243. Generally, "performance requirements"

refers

to

a

variety

of

requirements established by host states concerning the performance of foreignowned enterprises in their territory.

These requirements, imposed by law.

regulation, or policy are accorded usually to the Investor as conditions for
allowing the investment or for granting to it certain privileges. The main examples

of such measures are those requiring that a certain proportion of the foreign
enterprises production be supplied by local sources, that a certain percentage of
the production be exported or sold to local buyers. Other types of government
regulations, including controls on transfer of technology and on foreign exchange
and equity requirements, as well as a host of other specific measures, such as
manufacturing and product mandate requirements, may be considered
performance requirements. These requirements are usually applied to foreign
investment.

See STEPHEN E. GUISINGER ET AL., INVESTMENT

INCENTIVES AND

PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS (1985); see generally ROBERT E. BALDWIN, THE
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: TOWARDS GREATER LIBERALIZATION? (1979);
JAMES E. MEADE, TRADE AND WELFARE (1985); G. RUEBER ET AL., PRIVATE INVESTMENT

INDEVELOPMENT (1973).
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acquisition, expansion, management, conduct or operation of an
investment of an investor of a Party or a nonparty in its
territory." 2 "
The list of performance requirements includes

export performance, 245 domestic content, 246 domestic sourcing, 247
trade balancing, 24 8 product mandating, 249 and technology

transfer requirements. 2 50
In addition to prohibiting these
requirements, NAFTA prohibits a party from conditioning receipt
of incentives in connection with an investment in its territory by
requiring the investors of a NAFTA party or a nonparty to (1) give
preference to domestic sourcing, (2) achieve a certain level of
domestic content, or (3) achieve a certain trade balance by
restricting domestic sales to some proportion of exports or foreign
exchange earnings. 25 1 NAFTA allows the NAFTA states, however,
to condition the receipt of investment incentives on the location of
production facilities,
employment, employee
training, or
2 52
expansion of facilities in the NAFTA territory.
The NAFTA prohibition on performance requirements is a
departure from the Mexican foreign investment regime under the
1989 Regulations. 25 3
The 1989 Regulations liberalize foreign
direct investment by allowing foreign investment in any
proportion without governmental authorization for those activities
not explicitly reserved for the state or for Mexican nationals. 25 '
As a condition to the one hundred percent foreign ownership rule
in the 1989 Regulations, however, the foreign investor must
maintain a balance in foreign currency operations for the first
three years in operation. 2 55
These criteria resulted from
governmental policies designed to encourage foreign investment
that would complement and bolster the Mexican economy. The
244.
245.
246.
247.

NAFTA. supra note 1,art. 1106().

Id.
Id.
Id.

248. Id.

249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. art. 1106(3).
252. Id. art. 1106(4).
253. See 1989 Regulations,supra note 212.
254. See Id. art. 5.
255. Id. arts. 5 (I1), 28(I)(b)(i). The 1989 Regulations, supra note 212, set
forth additional conditions.
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1989 Regulations, while representing a dramatic departure from
Mexico's restrictive 1973 FIL, were balanced with the
to
requirements that would promote investment pursuant
2 56
Mexico's own self-determined economic development needs.
In the last decade, a number of Third World states have
adopted more flexible foreign investment policies, partly because
of their need for additional foreign capital to fuel economic
growth. 25 7 The incentive policies to attract foreign capital often
were coupled with controls on foreign direct investment as a
means of curbing the practices of TNCs.2 5 8 Industrialized states
maintain that these performance requirements limit foreign
participation in these markets and can be as injurious as
In their view, these performance
restrictive tariffs. 2 5 9
requirements, if left to multiply, could become a serious
impediment to a liberal world trading environment.
The issue of restrictive and distorting effects of performance
2
requirements has reemerged in the Uruguay Round of GATT. 60
Although performance requirements have been discussed on
several occasions in past GATT rounds, in the Uruguay Round,
the United States and some contracting parties to GATT offered
certain "proposals" aimed at expanding GATT's institutional
structure.2 6 1 One of these new issues, connected with issues of

trade-related

investment measures (TRIMs),

seeks

to link

investment policy with trade policy and thereby bring within the

framework of GATT rules those government investment measures
256. See 1989 Regulations,supra note 212.
257. See Edmund MA. Kwaw, GATT and the Debate about Investment
Liberalization, in THE LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 113,
114-15 (P. Ebow Bondzi-Simpson ed., 1992).

258. Id.
259. Id. at 115.
260. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter GATT].
261. Complaints about restrictive and distorting trade effects of governmental

investment requirements, such as local content requirements, manufacturing
requirements and limitations, domestic sales or export requirements, trade

balancing requirements, exchange or remittance restrictions, and licensing or
technology transfer requirements have been discussed on several occasions in
past GATT rounds. See Kwaw, supra note 257, at 114. A negotiating Group on
Trade-Related Investment Measures was established within the Uruguay Round
with a mandate to examine the trade restrictive and distorting effects of
investment measures. See Punta Del Este Ministerial Declaration [Ministerial
Declarationon the Uruguay Round], 33 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFs AND TRADE,
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOcUMENTs 19 (1987).

314

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27:259

that have a serious trade restrictive and distorting effect. 262 The
objective of the Uruguay Round with respect to TRIMs is to
liberalize international investment so that it operates on the same
basis as the conduct of international trade.
After having sought input from the business community,
the United States offered an illustrative list of TRIMs in its
negotiating plan. This extensive plan listed the kinds of TRIMs to
be prohibited and basic principles for an agreement. The initial
list of TRIMs submitted by the United States was rejected by
developing states because it constrained the ability of developing
states to control TNCs in their own territory. The coverage of
TRIMs accorded in the draft Uruguay Round text has been limited
primarly to
domestic
content
and
trade balancing
2
requirements. 6
The performance requirements in the Investment Chapter of
NAFTA, which parallel the original United States proposals during
the Uruguay Round, are much broader than the GATT TRIMs.
Because the Uruguay Round ended without the contracting
parties extending GATT to TRIMs, the performance requirements
in NAFTA will give the United States a significant amount of
leverage during the next Uruguay Round negotiations.
D. Transfers Relating to Investments
A foreign investment would be seriously impeded without the
ability to transfer capital and profits out of the host state.
Consequently, the transfer provision is one of the most important
provisions in NAFTA. The NAFTA monetary transfer provision

covers five basic issues relating to an investment of a NAFTA
party in the territory of another NAFTA party.2 64 NAFTA provides
that all of these transfers be made "freely and without delay," in
"a freely usable currency at the market rate of exchange." 28 5 This
includes transfers to the investor, such as remittance of profits

262. THE NEw GATr ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 500, 505
(Sec. D, subjects for negotiation) (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf eds.,
1986).
263. See The Draft Decision by the ContractingParties of the GAIT on TradeRelated Investment Measures (TRIMS) (Dec. 20, 1991).
264. NAFTA, supranote 1, art. 1109(1).
265. Id. art. 1109(2).
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and dividends, the payment of interest and capital gains,
management fees, and proceeds from the sale of liquidation of an
Transfer provisions in NAFTA also apply to
investment. 265
payments under contract for goods or services in an investment to
a third party, such as a subsidiary.
Industrialized states consider the ability to make. monetary
transfers one of the most important provisions in an investment
treaty. 2 67 Nevertheless, chronic balance-of-payment difficulties of

most host states, and the host states' need to conserve foreign
exchange to pay for essential goods and services, often make
them unwilling or unable to grant investors the unrestricted right
to make monetary transfers. 26 8 Most Third World states have
exchange control laws to regulate the conversion and currency
abroad. For further protection, Third World states either have
stipulated a rate of exchange in bilateral arrangements or have
referred to IMF exchange regulations. 2 6 9 The monetary transfers
dilemma exemplifies the conflicting goals of the industrialized and
Third World states. While industrialized states seek broad,
unrestricted guarantees on monetary transfers, Third World

states seek more restrictive options.

The NAFTA provision regarding monetary transfers echoes
the guarantees that industrialized states and their investors and
firms seek in order to maximize their investment projects. Under
NAFTA, foreign investors will be able to make any transfers
relating to an investment in a NAFTA state with broad and
unrestricted guarantees.
E. Expropriationand Compensation
The United States and other industrialized states have
maintained that the most dangerous risk to a foreign investor is
the expropriation of his property without compensation or with
In their view, the fear of
inadequate compensation. 270
266. Id. art. 1109.
267. Most BITs contain monetary transfer obligations providing that transfers
be made without delay. See Kbafil, supra note 61, at 360.
268. See Salacuse, supra note 62, at 669.
269. Id.
270. See generally Martin Domke, Foreign Nationalizations: Some Aspects of
ContemporaryInternationalLaw, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 595, 603 (1961) (examining the
origins of the "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation rule); Norman
Girvan, Expropriating the Expropriator:Compensation Criteriafrom a Third World
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expropriation and nationalization always has constituted a
serious impediment to foreign investment in Third World
states. 271 For their part, Third World states, particularly Mexico
and the rest of Lain America, as an expression of economic selfdetermination, 2 72 have called for a reappraisal of norms of
customary international law governing expropriation and
nationalization issues. 27 3 The result has been an international
community divided along North-South boundaries that Is unable
to formulate an effective legal mechanism to deal with this
conflict. 2 74
In the absence of an international consensus,
industrialized states have sought to establish legal regimes for
protecting foreign investments of their nationals and firms
through bilateral arrangements and now through NAFTA. At the
same time, they have sought to reaffirm in these agreements
traditional principles of international law of nationalization and
expropriation, including standards of compensation that reflect
the customary international law of an earlier era.
In this context, the NAFTA agreement on expropriation and

compensation clearly has fulfilled the United States objectives.
NAFTA provisions represent a significant shift from Mexico's
longstanding challenge to these principles-a challenge that
originated in the nineteenth century and is embedded in the very
fiber of Mexico's legal structure.
To fully understand the
significance of these NAFTA provisions, one must look at various
elements of the treaty's expropriation and compensation article,
Viewpoint, In 3 VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 153
(Richard Lillich ed., 1973) (describing the origins of the position of the Western
states on expropriations); Leslie L. Rood, CompensationforTakeovers In Africa, 11
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 522 (1977) (illustrating particular takeovers in Africa).
271. For the United States and other industrialized states, this fear was
intensified In the 1970's by new developments in international law, particularly
NIEO. Moreover, a series of expropriations of United States investments during
the late 1960s and 1970s underscored the need for strong protection in Third
World states. See David A. Gantz, The Marcona Settlement: New Forms of
Negotiation and Compensationfor Nationalized Property, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 474
(1977); see generally William D. Rogers, Of Missionaries,Fanatics,and Lawyers:
Some Thoughts on Investment Disputes In the Americas, 72 AM. J. INTL L. 1 (1978).
272. See Charterof Economic Rights, supra note 42.
273. I.
274. For a treatment of the conflict in expropriations law, see Rudolf Dolzer,
New Foundations of the Law of Expropriationof Allen Property, 75 AM. J. INT'L L.
553 (1981).
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from an historical perspective, with an emphasis on Mexico and
the Third World.
Article 1110 of the NAFTA Investment Chapter provides for
the protection of foreign investments against nationalization,
expropriation, and other forms of interference that are
"tantamount to nationalization or expropriation." 275 The Article
In
covers direct, indirect, and "creeping expropriation."2 78
accordance with traditional principles of international law, the
Article provides that investments may not be expropriated except:

for a public purpose; on a nondiscriminatory basis; in accordance
and upon payment of compensation as
with due process of law;
2 77
specified in the Article.
Generally, the right of a sovereign nation to expropriate
foreign property in its territory has not been disputed by Third
World and industrialized states. 2 78 The dispute usually involves
one or more of the four specified conditions. The condition most
often the source of controversy between the United States and
Mexico in particular, and Third World and industrialized states in
general, is the condition requiring payment of compensation.
NAFTA provides that adequate compensation is a condition
for lawful expropriation or nationalization and that compensation
must be paid without delay,2 79 equal to the fair market value of
the investment immediately before the expropriation took

275. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110.

276. "Creeping expropriation" involves measures whereby the government
increasingly imposes restrictions and controls, such as, excessive and repetitive
tax regulatory measures, on the foreign investment enterprises so as to make it
This leads to the sale or
difficult to continue In business at a profit.
abandonment of the project to the government or local private investors. It is the
cumulative effect of the measures which then has a de facto confiscatory effect in
that their combined effect results in depriving the investor of ownership, control,
or substantial benefits over his enterprise, even when each such measure taken
separately does not have this effect. See Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriationof
Allen Property, 1 ICSID REv. FOREIGN INVEsTMENT L.J. 41 (1986); see generally

Detlev F. Vagts, Coercion and Foreign Investment Rearrangements, 72 AM. J. INT'L
L. 17 (1978); Burns H. Weston, Constructive Takings Under InternationalLaw: A
Modest Foray Into the Problem of Creeping Expropriation, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 103
(1975).
277. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(1).
278. There are some regional agreements that are stricter with regard to
expropriation. Franziska Tschofen, Multilateral Approaches to the Treatment of
ForeignInvestment, 7 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 284, 408 (1992).
279. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(3).
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place, 2 80 including interest from the date of expropriation, 2 8 1 and
be fully realizable. 2 8 2

The compensation must also be fully

transferable, as provided by the transfer article.m
The NAFTA standard for compensation, providing that the

compensation be made "without delay," "equal to the fair market

value of the investment," and "fully realizable," is the United
States modem version of the Hull formula. 28 4 Most Third World
states oppose such high standards of valuation, and Instead

argue for "appropriate compensation... taking into account...
all circumstances that the State considers pertinent."2 85 In order
to understand fully the significance of the compensation standard
in light of North-South differences, it is important to discuss each

element of the formula.
The NAFTA element "fair market value" for compensation by

an expropriating state Is the standard advocated by the United
States and other industrialized states. 2 8

The combination of "fair

280. Id. art. 1110(2).
281. Id. art. 1110(4).
282. Id. art. 1110(3).
283. Id. art. 1109.
284. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
285. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(2).
286. See Francesco Francon, Compensation for Natlonalisaton of Foreign
Property: The Borderland Between Law and Equity, 24 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 255, 266
(1975). The Mexican Constitution of 1917, Article 27, provides in part, that
"[e]xpropriations can only be made by reason of utility and by means of
indemnity." MEX. CONST., supra note 77, art. 27. Although Mexico asserted that
compensation was not due under its own constitution, recompense was required
by United States standards. The argument thus ultimately becomes whose
standards will govern the controversy. The bottom line on recompense depends
on the state's capacity to apply its laws, which will also dictate the form and
manner of payment. See also Robert K. Goldman & John M. Paxman, Real
PropertyValuations In Argentina,Chile, and Mexico, in 3 VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED
PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 137-45 (Richard B. Lilich ed., 1973) (an excellent
discussion of the constitutional aspects of expropriations and the Mexican
valuation process); see generally PETER ADRIAANSE, CONFISCATION IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAw (1956); PAUL A. BARAN. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH
(1957); FREDERICK S. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS (1932); FREDERICK S.

DUNN, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF AMERICANS IN MEXICO (1933); CUTHBERT
JOSEPH, NATIONALITY AND DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION (1969); CASTOR H. P. LAw, THE
LOCAL REMEDIES RULES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1961); JOHN C. MCCARTHY, UNITED
STATES POLICY TOWARD FOREIGN EXPROPRIATION OF AMERicAN-OWNED PROPERTY
(1967); E.I. NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING
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market value in freely transferable dollars" provides the foreign
investor the highest value for the expropriated property.2s 7 In
recent years, the United States and other industrialized states
have attempted to incorporate the "fair market value" standard in
their BITs. 28
Third World states challenged the traditional stand in the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which provides

for compensation that is "appropriate" to the circumstances giving
rise to the expropriation. 2 89

Mexico's special

standard for

compensation employed during the oil nationalizations, excusing
expropriations that were "inspired by legitimate causes and the
aspirations of social justice," has also challenged the traditional
rules. In addition, Latin American states that support the Calvo
Doctrine allow their domestic
courts to determine the appropriate
29°
standard of compensation.
Third World opposition to the fair market value standard has
focused on the "ability to pay." Third World states have argued
that the problem with the fair market value standard, which
reaffirms the traditional rules of customary international law, is
that it would "thwart their1 efforts to carry out badly needed social
29
and economic reforms."
F. Settlement of Investment Disputes

Subchapter B of Chapter 11 establishes a mechanism for the
settlement of investment disputes between a NAFTA state and an
investor of another NAFTA state:
through international
arbitration in accordance with the International Centre for
Settlement
of Investment
Disputes
Convention
(ICSID
Convention) 29 2 or the United
Nations
Commission on
International Trade Law Arbitration Rules (UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules); 293 or through litigation before the courts of the NAFTA
state, at the election of the investor. It represents the first time
COUNTRIES

(1965);

MANNARAsWAMIGHALA

S.

RAJAN,

SOVEREIGNY OVER NATURAL

REsouRcEs (1978).
287. Franconi, supra note 286, at 266.
288. Id.
289. See Asante, supra note 11, at 599 (cting Reply of Mexican Minister of
Foreign Affairs dated Aug. 3, 1938, in STEiNER & VAGTs, supra note 30).

290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. NAFTA. supra note 1, art. 1120(1)(a)-(b).
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Mexico has entered into an international agreement providing for
Investor-state arbitration. An overview of some of the most
important provisions is important before discussing the
significance of the agreed-upon dispute provisions for Mexico.
1.

Coverage

Under the investor-state arbitration mechanism of Article
1116 of NAFTA, an investor of a NAFTA state, on his own behalf,
may submit to arbitration a claim for loss or damage resulting

from a breach by the NAFTA host state of a treaty provision. 294
Article 1117 permits an investor to assert a claim on behalf of an
enterprise that the investor owns or controls directly or
2 95
indirectly.
Subject to NAFTA, the investor-state arbitration provisions
reach actions taken by federal, state, and provincial governments;
certain actions by state enterprises; and actions taken by certain
state-chartered monopolies when the actions are inconsistent
with NAFTA. 2 96 An investor must bring a claim within three years
of when the investor or enterprise first acquired or should have
acquired knowledge of the loss or damage.
Subchapter B of Chapter 11 does not require or even
encourage arbitration as a first resort, nor does it require an
investor to exhaust local remedies. It seeks to preserve the
maximum scope for amicable settlement of disputes. Article 1118
therefore promotes initial dispute settlement through consultation
or negotiation. 2 9 7 If these efforts at an amicable settlement are
not successful, then NAFTA provides for the submission of the
dispute in accordance with previously agreed procedures.

294. Id. art. 1116.
295. Id. art. 1117.
296. Id.arts. 1116, 1117.
297. Id. art. 1118.
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2.
Submission of a Claim to Arbitration 2 98 and Conditions
Precedent 2 99
With certain exceptions, the stage of compulsory arbitration
in Article 1120 is reached after six months have elapsed from the
date giving rise to the claim. An investor may submit a claim for
arbitration under the Investment Chapter only if certain
conditions are satisfied. First, the investor (and enterprise, when
the claim is submitted on its behalf) must consent to arbitration
in accordance with the procedures set out in NAFTA. Second, the
investor and the enterprise must waive the right to initiate or
continue before any administrative tribunal or court, under the
law of any NAFTA state, or other dispute settlement procedures,

any proceedings on the measure that is alleged to breach NAFTA,
except for proceedings for injunctive, declaratory, or other
extraordinary relief not involving the payment of damages. Third,
the consent and waiver must be delivered to the host state in
3 00
writing.
Article 1122 provides that a disputing investor may submit
the claim to arbitration under: the ICSID Convention, provided
that both the host and the investor's home state are parties to the
Convention; the Additional Facility Rules of the ICSID
Convention, provided that either host state or the investor's state
is a party to the Convention; or UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. At
present, only the United States is a party to the ICSID
Convention.
3.

3 0°
Consolidation of Claims

When two or more claims submitted to arbitration have a
question of law or fact in common, Article 1126 provides that the
claims may "in the interests of fair and efficient resolution of the
claims" be consolidated and heard by a tribunal established
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, except as modified by
NAFTA.3 0 2
After hearing the disputing parties on whether

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. art. 1120.
Id. art. 1121.
Id. art. 1121(3).
Id. art. 1126.
Id. art.1126(2).
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consolidation in a particular dispute meets the criteria of Article
26, the decision-to consolidate can be made.
4.

Governing Law

Article 1131 provides that an arbitration tribunal must
decide the issues of dispute in accordance with NAFTA and
applicable rules of international law.
5.

Significance to Mexico

The NAFTA investment dispute settlement mechanism
represents a significant departure for Mexico with respect to the
role of international law in International economic relations.
Mexico's distrust of private-state arbitration stems from the Calvo
Doctrine, 3 03 which denies that the state of the owner can

intervene on his behalf against the host state.

Investment

contracts between states and foreign investors commonly include
a Calvo Clause 0 under which a foreign investor agrees, as part
of his submission to local law, not to seek the diplomatic
intervention of his government in any matter arising out of the
contract. The Mexican interpretation of these clauses is that the
foreign investor is bound by the local rule of law, even in the face
of a violation of international law.3 0 5 When foreign investment is
concerned, the import of the Calvo Doctrine is that arbitration is
an unacceptable yielding of sovereignty. The arbitral procedures
in the dispute settlement mechanism in NAFTA wil have a
significant impact on international economic relations between
Third World and industrialized state.

303. See the discussion of the Calvo Doctrine,
accompanying text.
304. Id.
305. Id.

supra note

19 and
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V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NAFTA INVESTMENT PROVISIONS FOR THE
THIRD WORLD

The foregoing assessment of the investment provisions in
Chapter 11 of NAFTA demonstrates that Mexico's attitude towards
foreign direct investment and the role of international law in its
regulation have changed significantly. Since the nineteenth
century Mexico persistently has challenged the traditional
principles of state responsibility, asserting the sovereign interests
of the host state. Inspired by the profound transformation in the
political structure of the world in the 1960s and 1970s, Mexico
led the Third World in challenging the traditional principles that
had been established without the Third World's participation and
Third World states, contending that political
consent.
developments had not been followed by economic and social
transformation, called for a restructuring of international law.
The emergence in the mid- 1970s of the proposals for a NIEO was
one of the many indicators of the development of a consensus
among the developing states on the rules governing North-South
economic relations. The purpose of these new legal rules was to

replace the structure of international economic relations with a
fairer system, in an attempt to close the widening gap between
Third World and industrialized states to remove international
disequilibria and disparities.
More than two decades after the attack by Third World states
on the traditional concept of state responsibility, the Third World
is experiencing changing attitudes about foreign investment.
Debt-burdened Third World states, in need of capital, have begun
to re-open their economy to foreign investment. Like Mexico,
these states are entering into arrangements with industrialized
states that are reinvigorating traditional rules for international
investment protection. But none of these arrangements have the
broad scope of protection for foreign investment found in the
investment provisions in NAFTA. These provisions reaffirm the
traditional principles of international law. The negotiation of
NAFTA by a Third World state and two industrialized states is
significant for future North-South international economic
relations.
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A. Toward A New Frameworkforthe Regulation of ForeignDirect
Investment
The investment provisions In Chapter 11 'of NATA probably
will serve as a model for other treaties between the ninety
industrialized and Third World states in future negotiations.
While on a theoretical level a trilateral accord is not likely to serve
as the basis for the development of customary norms of
international law, the combination of the BIT movement and the
investment provisions in NAFTA may be seen as part of an
ongoing process to create a new international framework for the
regulation of foreign direct investment. While NAFTA only binds
the three signatories, the powerful position of the United States in
the international arena, and of Mexico in the Third World,
certainly will promote the NAFTA framework for foreign direct
investment and lay the foundation for the creation of an
international investment framework that may eventually attract
the consensus of both Third World, and industrialized states. For
industrialized states, the provisions of the NAFTA Investment

Chapter--establishing a secure investment environment through
the elaboration of broad rules of fair treatment of foreign
investment and investors, removal of barriers to investment by
eliminating or liberalizing existing restrictions, and dispute
settlement mechanisms for investors and host states--serve to
provide a stable environment for their investments abroad, in a
manner which responds to the demands of the new
interdependent global economy.
needing foreign
capital and
Third World states,
nonindigenous technological expertise to develop their economies
and promote growth, will be under more pressure by
industrialized states to accept investment protection provisions
similar to those enunciated in NAFTA. Using the United States
BIT movement as a source of comparison, the states formerly
representing the Soviet bloc and the Latin American states,
ideologically or legally opposed to the free-market model
underlying the BIT, have found that much needed capital for
economic development superseded their initial rejection of the
BIT.
The provisions in the NAFTA Investment Chapter will also
have a significant impact on the new wave of bilateralism for
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negotiating foreign investment regimes. The United States and
other industrialized states consistenly have been utilizing the
bilateral approach for negotiating with Third World states for the
last decade. While general bilateral commercial agreements have
a long history, the specialized bilateral investment treaty is a
relatively new phenomenon the origins of which lie in the postWorld War II era. The new barriers to foreign direct investment
that Third World states erected during the 1960s and 1970s,
inspired by nationalistic concepts as permanent sovereignty over
natural resources and economic activities and the NIEO, 3° 8 urged
the United States and other industrialized states to develop a
model and prototype investment treaties to serve as a basis for

bilateral treaty negotiations. While the initial attempts during the
1980s appeared successful, in reality it had only moderate
success. The underlying open investment regime in NAFTA will
encourage other industrialized states to take the bilateral

approach.
The problem with the bilateral approach is that Third World
and industrialized states are unequal political and economic
partners. As such, their primary concern is protecting foreign
investment, not addressing the concerns of TNC operations or
economic development.
B. The End of the North-South Dialogue
The negotiation of the open investment regime in NAFTA
between Mexico, one of the most developed Third World states
and an opponent of international rules governing property, and
the United States, demonstrates the success of bilateralism. The
multilateral arena, including the United Nations family of
organizations, GATT and others, frequently have been dominated
by North-South disagreements. Within this multilateral fora, the
industrialized states are greatly outnumbered. As such, with
regard to international economic relations, the United States and
other industrialized states have attempted to secure legal rules for
the protection of their nationals and their property abroad
through bilateral arrangements.
The bilateral process, particularly between two states of

unequal political and economic power, may have significant
implications for Third World states. Mexico's need to reform its
306. See supra note 34-41 and accompanying text.
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economy was widely publicized. President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari travelled to Europe and Asia in search of commitments of
foreign capital to spearhead Mexico's economic reforms. Unable
to obtain commitment from either state, Salinas' only option was
to ask the United States about the possibility of negotiating a
trade pact.
The NAFTA investment provisions, reaffirming the traditional
rules governing foreign property, do not incorporate any of the
concerns of Third World states, particularly regarding the
behavior of TNCs in host territories. The Third World states need
for capital and technology will force others to enter into similar
agreements. Even if this is the case, Third World states should be
concerned about the long-term durability of these bilateral
arrangements. While the less developing states were the most
attracted to bilateral arrangements in the early 1980s, Mexico's
negotiation of NAFTA has now placed bilateralism in a different

light.
C. National Sovereignty and Property Rights

In the promotion for new international rules governing
foreign investment, developing states have asserted the right to
modify property relations in accordance with national priorities.
The open investment regime in NAFTA, with no provisions
addressing either development objectives of the host state or TNC
operations, in essence places the state in a position in which its
sovereignty and autonomy are compromised.
While both Third World and developing states have adopted
policies and mechanisms for the promotion and protection of
foreign investment through the use of industrial and fiscal
incentives and the creation of protective legal regimes, the
internalization of the global economy and the interdependence of
industries and economies have demonstrated the need for a
Industrialized
compromise international regulation scheme.
states have attempted to formulate this scheme on a bilateral
basis assuring that their TNCs have free access to developing
states. The lack of national control over economic decisionmaking
and the loss to the national economy of high profits are among
the most serious effects of foreign direct investment on Third
World nations.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Chapter 11 of NAFTA represents a major departure from
and
position on foreign investment
Mexico's previous
international economic relations. Since the nineteenth century
Mexico has challenged the traditional rules of international law
governing foreign investment and has pursued a restrictive
nationalist position toward the flow of foreign capital. During the
1960s and 1970s, Mexico and other Third World states called for
the restructuring of international law in order to equalize
international economic relations. While both Third World and
industrialized states have made numerous attempts to formulate
an international framework for foreign direct investments, few
have been successful. In the last decade, Third World states in
need of foreign capital and technology have negotiated bilateral
arrangements with industrialized states establishing specific rules
governing foreign investment. The NAFTA breadth of coverage
and the ninety-five specific rules of its Investment Chapter exceed
those found in any bilateral or multilateral instrument to which
any NAFTA signatory is a party.

This Article was authored prior to Mexico's
[Editor's Note:
passage on December 27, 1993 of the Foreign Direct Investment
Law, which implemented many of NAFTA's investment principles.]

